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Running out of time: Public opinions on growth and degrowth in Montreal 
Samantha Mailhot Prévost 
 
As every nation in the world continues its pursuit for everlasting economic growth, global 
temperatures are increasing at an alarming rate. For decades, scholars have warned about human 
impacts on the environment, cautioning us on our exhaustive use of resources and the implications 
of our seemingly innate need to grow economically. It has been asserted that economic growth is 
not sustainable, and its contraction is unavoidable due to natural limits, therefore any research on 
managing and prospering without growth is of great value. Degrowth has been put forth as an 
alternative paradigm, and as the movement is required to be democratic and collective, public 
opinions are crucial for its mobilization. Accordingly, public opinions on the matter need to be 
evaluated in order to assess the potential for implementing degrowth policies. Public opinion studies 
on degrowth are scarce, especially in North America. This study aims to contribute to the literature 
by assessing public opinions on degrowth in Montréal, by collecting data on support for 6 degrowth 
policy proposals (limiting trade distances and volume, creating a moratorium on new infrastructure, 
taxing resource use, progressive taxation, implementing a basic income and reducing work hours), 
and support for a societal degrowth transition. I find that the majority of respondents support 4 out 
of 6 policy proposals, and the majority also support a degrowth transition. This study shows 
Montréal to be a promising city for experimenting with degrowth politics. Establishing concrete 
strategies for its implementation that address public concerns could prove degrowth to be a 
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1.1 A state of emergency 
The current atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration is the highest it has been in three 
million years (Willeit et al., 2019). The science is clear: Earth’s atmosphere and oceans have 
warmed, snow and ice volume have diminished, sea levels have risen, and the concentrations of 
greenhouse gases have increased (IPCC, 2013). There is ample data that confirms anthropogenic 
activity is altering the Earth’s climate system, which is validated by a 97% consensus among 
scientists (Cook et al., 2013). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the 
international body for assessing the science related to climate change, projected outcomes on 
human health that are likely to affect the wellbeing of millions of people globally. These effects 
include large populations effected by malnutrition, increased mortality rates, disease and injury 
due to heat waves, fires, storms and droughts, increased vector-borne diseases, such as malaria and 
dengue fever, and many more (IPCC, 2013).  
For decades, scholars have warned about human impacts on the environment, cautioning 
us on our exhaustive use of resources and the implications of our seemingly innate need for 
economic growth as individuals, societies and nations (e.g. Carson, 1962; Daly, 1991, 1996; 
Georgescu-Roegen, 1971, 1975; Hirsch, 1976; Meadows et al., 1972). Human activity has led to 
the near transgression of four out of the nine planetary boundaries (Steffen et al., 2015a) identified 
by Rockström et al. (2009), each of which has the potential to destabilize the Earth system and 






damage to phosphorous and nitrogen cycles, climate change and land use. The three that remain 
in the ‘safe operating space’ are freshwater use, ocean acidification, and stratospheric ozone 
depletion. The boundaries of the remaining two, atmospheric aerosol loading and novel entities 
(materials not previously known to the Earth system) have not yet been quantified. The 2015 Paris 
Agreement established the international goal of limiting global temperature increase to well below 
2°C above pre-industrial levels (period 1850-1900) but to aim to limit it to 1.5°C to reduce the 
risks and impacts of climate change (UNFCCC, 2015). However, the United Nations’ Emissions 
Gap Report 2018 confirmed that global efforts have been inadequate thus far. The field of 
Ecological Economics has developed considerably over the past century, notably delivering 
critiques of economic growth. Researchers have determined that the 2°C threshold will likely be 
exceeded if growth continues, and ideas of sustainable development and green growth will not 
adequately address the climate crisis (e.g. Hickel & Kallis, 2019). Many have asserted that 
economic growth is not compatible with social and ecological sustainability (e.g. D’Alisa et al., 
2015; Kallis et al., 2018; Kosoy et al., 2012; Martinez-Alier, 2009).  
One concern is that environmental issues have flared into a global conversation since the 
early 1970s, and still the global community has not figured out how to address environmental 
issues adequately. Enhanced media coverage on the climate crisis is focusing on international 
green movements such as Extinction Rebellion, which aims to achieve radical socioeconomic 
change through nonviolent civil disobedience to minimize the risk of ecological collapse 
(Extinction Rebellion, 2019); Greta Thunberg’s school strikes for climate which involves school 
students around the world striking from class to pressure government action in preventing further 
global warming and climate change (Fridays for Future, 2019; media e.g. Monbiot, 2019); and the 






inequality through an intersectional lens” (e.g. Mayes, 2019). There has also been media coverage 
on the increase in extreme natural events including heat waves, inundation, extreme precipitation 
and tropical cyclones/hurricanes affecting millions of people around the world (e.g. Maclean, 
2019). A rise in media coverage should mean an increase in social awareness of the current 
environmental issues. Notably, the aforementioned movements have brought about some political 
discussion in Europe (e.g. see Watts, 2019), though this has not yet lead to substantial changes in 
the way we live.   
 
1.2 Degrowth as a possible solution 
 One proposed solution to the climate crisis, environmental degradation and global 
inequality has received far less attention: the degrowth movement. Put forth to address such issues, 
the movement calls for radical dematerialization, and political and economic reorganization in 
order to drastically reduce resource and energy throughput (e.g. Kallis et al., 2018). It is considered 
‘radical’ because of its unparalleled scale and the significant social, cultural and political changes 
it would entail (Kallis, 2017). Degrowth can be characterized by three pillars of thought (D’Alisa 
et al., 2014). First, it calls for the abolishment of economic growth as a social objective. Second, 
it calls for equitable downscaling of production and consumption that will reduce societies’ 
material and energy throughput, as mentioned above. Lastly, degrowth does not call for solely 
doing less of the same, but signifies doing things differently. In other words, degrowth implies a 
“society with a smaller metabolism, but more importantly, a society with a metabolism which has 
a different structure and serves new functions” (D’Alisa et al., 2014). At a rudimentary scale, 
degrowth advocates for simpler, secure and more communal life (Kallis, 2011) and would make 






Accompanying these pillars of thought are concrete degrowth goals with related policy 
proposals (Cosme et al., 2017). These goals are to: (1) reduce the environmental impact of human 
activities through policies that reduce material and energy consumption, create incentives for local 
production and consumption, and promote changes in consumption patterns, etc. (e.g. tax 
consumption, pollution and resource use; create moratoria on new infrastructure, and resource use 
and extraction); (2) redistribute income and wealth both within and between countries through 
policies that promote a fair distribution of resources through redistributive policies of income and 
capital assets, promote work-sharing, create a citizen’s income and salary caps, etc.; (3) to promote 
the transition from a materialistic to a convivial and participatory society through policies that 
promote downshifted lifestyles, reduce working hours, and explore the value of unpaid and 
informal activity.  
The political and economic feasibility of a degrowth transition has been well addressed and 
challenged in academic literature (e.g. Büchs & Koch, 2019; Tokic, 2012; van den Bergh, 2011), 
whereas the social and cultural feasibility remains understudied. Among revolutionizing economic 
structures and changing values, a cultural revolution is needed for degrowth to gain momentum 
(D’Alisa et al., 2014; Latouche, 2009). The degrowth movement arose from the global North, from 
and for individuals who enjoy comparatively high levels of objective and subjective wellbeing 
(Büchs & Koch, 2019), and are concerned with the cultural desire for ever-increasing levels of 
income and consumption. A democratically led transition whereby individuals would both 
voluntarily choose, and even more, politically fight for simpler and more frugal lives is hard to 







1.3 Degrowth in Québec 
Yves-Marie Abraham (2019) wrote an article touching on the founding of the Québec 
Movement for a Convivial Degrowth (MQDC: le Mouvement Québécois pour une Décroissance 
Conviviale) in 2007, which is comprised of a broad range of activists, and academics. The 
MQDC’s main objective was to introduce and promote the idea of degrowth in public discourse in 
Québec. They organized study groups, workshops, public lectures and seminars to fuel discussion. 
It is thanks to this community that Abraham was able to create and teach the first university course 
on degrowth in Canada, at HEC Montréal. The author advocates for producing less, sharing more, 
restoration and creation of the commons, and making “genuinely democratic decisions about how 
we should live together”. Abraham gives examples of degrowth initiatives in Montreal: the Milton-
Parc housing co-operative; the Bâtiment 7 local services centre; the La Remise tool library; the 
Champ des Possibles, a self-managed community garden, and UPop Montreal, a free People’s 
University. Co-operatives are closely tied to degrowth as they share very similar values: voluntary 
and open membership; democratic member control; member economic participation; autonomy 
and independence; commitment to education about the nature and benefits of co-operation; 
cooperation among cooperatives; and concern for the sustainable development of their 
communities (International Co-operative Alliance; Johanisova et al., 2015). Abraham affirms that 
it is necessary to multiply such initiatives, build networks, and seek support from existing 








1.4 Research objectives and thesis structure  
Because degrowth has to be democratic, and public opinion plays an important political 
role in influencing social outcomes, popular support is crucial for its mobilization (Kallis, 2011; 
2018; Xu & Li, 2018). With this in mind, this research centers on public opinions on degrowth in 
Montréal. Using a quantitative approach with the administration of an online survey to 385 
Montréal residents, my aim is to learn about the potential for a degrowth transition in Québec and 
Canada. I present data on participants’ socio-demographics, environmental values, support for 
degrowth policies and support for a degrowth transition in Canada. I also assess the effect of 
inviting respondents to reflect on their support for policies through a social rationality rather than 
their own individual rationality. This is a concept discussed by Etzioni (1988), where he introduced 
the I&We paradigm that separates individuals thinking and acting rationally on their own (“I”) and 
individuals thinking and acting with their community in mind (“We”). To do this, I provide 
information on how the policy would impact their community or society rather than just them.  
In this thesis, I begin by providing a literature review wherein I summarize critiques of 
economic growth, provide an in-depth definition of degrowth, and offer a review of the policy 
proposals and barriers and public opinions on degrowth. Further, I present a review of the 
determinants of environmental values, provide an introduction to the concept of social rationality, 
and finally I provide a brief summary on gaps in the literature. I then introduce the methodology 
for the thesis, including the survey sample and data collection process and a discussion of the 
variables. I provide a data analysis section, where I discuss the data set, my hypotheses and 
introduce the procedures for the statistical and qualitative analyses. The results section begins with 
an overview and brief discussion of the respondents’ pre-existing environmental values. I then 






the determinants of policy support, the overall support for a degrowth transition in Canada and the 
determinants for this support. I end the results section with a summary of open-ended answers 
respondents provided for not supporting policies. The third chapter of my thesis ends with a 




























2.1 Background: Economic growth and sustainability 
Economic growth is generally defined as an increase in the monetary values of the goods 
and services produced by an economy in a given period of time, typically a year (Victor, 2015). It 
has been critiqued almost as long as it has existed. One of the more popular examples of 
investigation into economic growth was Donella Meadows and colleagues in The Limits to 
Growth, in which they wrote about growth trends in world population, industrialization, pollution, 
food production, and resource depletion. They concluded that the biophysical limits to growth 
would be reached within a century if these trends are maintained (Meadows et al., 1972). The 
authors offered a second outcome, in which economic and ecological sustainability were to be met 
by altering the above trends in order to reach a ‘global equilibrium’ whereby every individual has 
equal opportunity and their basic needs met. Fifty years later, we find ourselves moving closer and 
closer to the former outcome, as global resource use currently follows the “collapse by 2050” 
scenario presented in the report (Jackson & Webster, 2016). It has become common knowledge 
that economic growth is also one of the main drivers for rising GHG emissions (e.g. Peters et al., 
2017; Zhang et al., 2014). Human socio-economic activities have led to stark changes in the Earth 
system, as can be visualized in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 (taken from Steffen et al., 2015b). 
As environmental degradation has accelerated, several arguments have been put forth 
against the idea of sustainable economic growth. One example is the inevitable depletion of non-
renewable energy and material sources (Heinberg, 2010). Another example is the reliance on 






and carbon capture and storage (CCS) (such as bioenergy with carbon capture and storage 
(BECCS)); technologies that are currently at “little more than a conceptual stage of development” 
















                                   Figure 2.1 Trends from 1750 to 2010 in globally aggregated indicators for     






















                      Figure 2.2 Trends from 1750 to 2010 in indicators for the structure and  
                          functioning of the Earth System (Steffen et al., 2015b) 
 
Attempts to tackle climate change while maintaining economic growth have been presented 
through the use of carbon markets, as a way to help emissions reduction using cap-and-trade and 
carbon offset programs. These tactics involve the continued use of fossil fuels while imposing 
limitations. Cap-and-trade involves emissions limits and giving or selling tradable legal rights to 
emit, while carbon offset programs allow the investment of mitigation techniques in other 
countries (usually developing) in order to gain carbon credits which allow further emissions. There 
are several reasons to be skeptical of these solutions. Stuart et al. (2019), by following Karl 
Polanyi, assert that further commodification of nature is paradoxical and will only heighten risks 






our wrongful use of labour, land and money (and carbon credits) as if they were objects that were 
produced for sale on the market. For one, Stuart et al. (2019) argue that carbon markets only 
reinforce the structural causes of climate change by furthering capitalist expansion through the 
increase of carbon commodification rather than reducing it. Carbon markets therefore ignore the 
contradictions between nature and capitalism. Second, they argue that attempts to commodify 
carbon can result in unexpected and catastrophic outcomes, as carbon and climatic systems are 
still not fully understood, and that falsely assuming control over the carbon cycle will only increase 
risks to society. Third, carbon markets increase risks to society and hinder climate change 
mitigation by undermining potential policy and social alternatives that would more effectively 
address the issue. Lastly, by accepting capitalism as a given, the use of carbon markets as a solution 
simply preserve the status quo and only further, inequality, hierarchy and domination in society 
(Stuart et al., 2019). 
There has also been widespread criticism on how growth, progress and social welfare are 
measured. Gross domestic product (GDP) is the monetary, market value of all final goods and 
services produced in a country over a period of a year (van den Bergh, 2009). GDP is reported to 
have several shortcomings such as: interpreting every expense as positive even if it is welfare-
reducing (Kubiszewski et al., 2013; Talberth et al., 2007); failing to measure social welfare and 
capture the lack of satisfaction of basic needs (e.g. food, water, shelter); failing to recognize the 
value of informal activities and services outside the market (e.g. subsistence agriculture, child 
care); and lack of accounting for environmental degradation and the depletion of natural resources 
(van den Bergh, 2009). Concerned with these issues, van den Bergh (2011) put forth that GDP, “a 
systemic piece of misinformation”, acts as a barrier to good policies. In other words, it is in fact 






growth paradigm has failed us. Not only has it been unsuccessful in eradicating hunger, poverty 
and global inequality (Büchs & Koch, 2019), it is responsible for financial and social inequality, 
environmental degradation, and environmental injustice (unequal allocation of environmental 
hazards and environmental racism) (Natale et al., 2016). Meanwhile, Büchs & Koch (2019) find 
the Global North continues to enjoy comparatively higher levels of both objective and subjective 
wellbeing than the Global South.  
Economic growth remains one of the main goals for every nation (United Nations, 2019), 
despite evidence that continued economic growth is not sustainable (e.g. Jackson, 2009). This is 
evidence that has been researched, reported and ignored by politicians and world leaders (Daly, 
2013). If there are countless problems associated with growth, why does it preoccupy so many? It 
is argued that differences in views on the matter lead people to be unsure about the relationship of 
growth and the environment (Drews, Antal & van den Bergh, 2018), and therefore unaware of the 
critical situation at hand. Büchs and Koch (2019) elaborate on the stabilizing role that growth has 
played for modern societies by providing employment, rising wages, public services, 
representative democracy, the rule of law and current legal, financial, labour market, education, 
research, and welfare systems. Notably, the authors discuss how economic growth is “very deeply 
anchored in people’s minds, bodies and identities” and has influenced ways of thinking about 
rights, justice, freedom, private property, and individual responsibility. Economic growth is also 
seen as being linked to wellbeing by the majority of politicians and the population (Büchs & Koch, 
2019). Growth is additionally seen as being crucial to escape recessions and realize progress (Antal 
and van den Bergh, 2016). For these, and many other reasons, the pursuit for growth continues. 






Sustainable development has been defined as development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. For 
sustainable development to be achieved, it is crucial to harmonize three core elements: 
economic growth, social inclusion and environmental protection. These elements are 
interconnected and all are crucial for the well-being of individuals and societies. 
There have been several approaches presented to sustainably maintain growth in recent 
decades. Presently, green growth is the widely accepted solution to the climate crisis, notably 
because it has been advertised as a win-win scenario maintaining both economic growth and 
ecological integrity (Antal & van den Bergh, 2016). Green growth can be defined as “economic 
growth accompanied by a reduction of a society’s throughput” (Kallis et al., 2018), throughput 
being the materials and energy a society extracts, processes, transports and distributes, to consume 
and return back to the environment as waste (Daly, 1996).  
Many scholars argue that growth cannot be maintained on our finite planet, and that growth 
scenarios represent a dangerous and uncertain mitigation tactic and that the current growth-based 
paradigm is not compatible with environmental sustainability (e.g. Martinez-Alier, 2009). It has 
been argued that economic contraction is unavoidable due to natural limits (Jackson 2009, Kallis 
et al. 2012), therefore any research on managing and prospering without growth is of great value. 
Many seem to believe that growth is a part of human nature, but Kallis (2018) illustriously counters 
this idea in writing: children and trees only grow “up” to a point, and perpetual growth does not 
exist in nature. Either by choice or by necessity, there are several societies that are not growth 
oriented that have existed throughout history and continue to exist today (Kallis et al., 2018). The 
authors put forth a series of “peripheral niches” around the world that can inform alternatives to 






One example they discuss is the idea of “buen vivir” (living well), which originated from South 
America as an alternative to conventional ideas about development. Through cultural traditions 
and concepts among indigenous groups, “buen vivir” signifies the prioritization of ecological 
balance and community wellbeing (Gudynas, 2015; Kallis et al., 2018). With many other 
examples, the idea that alternatives to growth are not achievable can be countered.  
 
2.3 Degrowth 
To address climate change and all other issues associated with economic growth, degrowth 
has been proposed as an alternative to the current growth paradigm. Degrowth is the translation of 
the French word ‘décroissance’ which was first used in 1972 by French intellectual André Gorz, 
with a focus on resource limits, the impossibility of growth in a finite world and the need to relate 
economics to the biosphere (Kallis, Demaria & D’Alisa, 2015). From there, ‘décroissance’ became 
an activist slogan in 2001 when a movement formed in France from protests for car-free cities, 
food cooperatives and campaigns against advertising (and more). This phase of ‘décroissance’ is 
characterized as by critiques of ‘sustainable development’ (Kallis, Demaria & D’Alisa, 2015). 
Ideas of degrowth spread and gained interest, which led to the eventual organization of 
international conferences (Kallis, Demaria & D’Alisa, 2015). The English term ‘degrowth’ was 
officially adopted at the first Degrowth conference in Paris in 2008, which marked the beginning 
of degrowth as an international research area (Demaria et al., 2013). Today, degrowth is a concept 
debated in academia and is taught at universities all around the world (Kallis, Demaria & D’Alisa, 
2015). While degrowth is stated as being “rich in its meanings and [not embracing] one single 
philosophical current” (Demaria et al., 2013), it is commonly defined as “an equitable downscaling 






conditions at the local and global level, in the short and long term” (Schneider, Kallis & Martinez-
Alier, 2010). Research in the field of degrowth involves covering many different aspects through 
several disciplines like ecological economics, economics, political science, history, anthropology 
and technology studies, creating a holistic approach to the proposed paradigm shift (Kallis et al., 
2018). While there exist different visions of degrowth, the literature presented here mainly focuses 
on the vision put forth by Kallis and colleagues.  
At the core of the degrowth movement today are numerous interconnected ideas and beliefs 
about how to make the world a better place for all living beings. Degrowth represents an end to 
the exploitation upon which growth is dependent. To acquire the necessary surplus for investment 
and growth, governments and capitalists exploit individuals around the world by, say, not paying 
them the real value of their work. Kallis (2018) puts forth that a vision of an egalitarian and 
classless degrowth society, whereby a socially sustainable downscaling of throughput would be 
possible through coupled equality and sharing. This would entail the creation of institutions and 
norms that ensure no individual or group can excessively accumulate wealth or power (Kallis, 
2018). A degrowth economy would therefore be considerably different through changes in power 
structures and levels of equality. Namely, Kallis (2018) argues that the hierarchy of work that 
sustains the economy would be inverted, where unpaid care work would be valued, and co-
operatives or not-for-profits would be the dominant producers as opposed to privately owned 
firms. This would entail a reduction of production for profit and opportunities for accumulation. 
Kallis (2018), among other authors (e.g. Stuart et al., 2019), relatedly advocate for a 
decommodification of land, labour and value. Vail (2010) states that decommodification is any 
political, social, or cultural process that reduces the scope and influence of the market in everyday 






provision of public goods and expand social protection; promote democratic control over the 
market by creating economic circuits grounded in a logic predicated on social needs rather than 
profit; and undermine market hegemony by revealing the market’s true social costs and 
consequences.  
Degrowth is concerned with replacing heteronomy, a condition of being ruled or governed 
by others (e.g. the state), with autonomy, the ability to rule ourselves independently and 
consciously (Castoriadis, 1987). Relatedly, Deriu (2015a) discusses capitalism as a subset of the 
growth-based society, reviewing the work of psychoanalyst Bruno Bettelheim (1991) which 
illustrates how addiction to material comforts has been perpetuated by consumer culture and 
technology. This is rooted in the popular belief that technology can and will solve the current 
socio-ecological crises we face, a reliability which in turn leaves individuals feeling powerless and 
deeply obstructs autonomy (Deriu, 2015). Degrowth aspires to move away from the idea of vital 
economic growth and aims to rebuild societies that are self-instituted and self-regulated (Latouche, 
2009). These ideas tie into Castoriadis’ (1979) notion of depoliticization linked with modern 
societies in that important decision making is no longer collective but instead left for experts, in 
turn undermining autonomy. This deprivation of involvement in the political arena has led 
degrowth to a call for direct democracy, the direct participation of citizens in decision-making. 
Castoriadis states: “To decide means to decide for oneself. To decide who is to decide, already is 
not quite deciding for oneself. The only total form of democracy is therefore direct democracy.” 
Direct democracy requires that all economic, political and other structures of society be based on 
local, concrete collectives; that citizens be physically present for decision-making; and that citizens 






allow for community involvement through total political participation of individuals, rather than 
external authorities making decisions for them (Castoriadis, 1979).  
Further, Deriu (2015b) draws on work from Ivan Illich (1973) in examining the role of 
conviviality in degrowth; broadly encompassing a transition from our dependence on industrially-
produced tools that are made to break and perpetuate said demand, to tools that individuals can 
easily learn to use and fix, thus resulting in freedom and autonomy. Conviviality additionally 
allows space for the development of personal relationships and social bonding. Briefly revisiting 
capitalism, Andreucci and McDonough (2015) connect it to degrowth by elaborating on 
capitalism’s growth dynamic, whereby expansion and competition for money, labour, raw 
materials and markets continuously feed into each other. Moreover, the authors explore the cultural 
and political aspects of capitalism, pointing out how ‘new needs and limitless wants are stimulated 
through marketing’, and that there exists a dominant logic of continuous accumulation. With the 
knowledge of growth being incompatible with social and ecological sustainability, it is therefore 
argued that degrowth is incompatible with capitalism (Andreucci & McDonough, 2015). As a 
response, the degrowth movement calls for dematerialization, a term signifying a “tremendous 
reduction in the quantity of materials used to serve the production and consumption needs of our 
planet”, which is intended to address environmental issues at their source (Lorek, 2015). 
Correspondingly, degrowth involves more localized production, whereby, for example, food 
production and consumption occur in the same local area (Kallis, 2018).  
Other core degrowth ideas include care, happiness and simplicity. Care involves everyday 
work of individuals maintaining welfare for themselves and for those around them through 
devotion to sustenance, reproduction and contentment of human relationships (D’Alisa, Deriu & 






relational integrity of every human being, it has been undervalued for years because it is not 
considered productive labour, the only labour which is valued in capitalist societies (D’Alisa, 
Deriu & Demaria, 2015). The growth imperative under capitalism therefore restricts the time 
individuals are able to commit to themselves, their family and friends, and civil and political 
activities (D’Alisa, Deriu & Demaria, 2015). Considering that the above elements of care increase 
happiness and subjective well-being, scholars advocate to centralize care and redistribute the 
necessary work across gender and class, which would ultimately influence a reduction of working 
hours and less devotion to the economic sphere (D’Alisa, Deriu & Demaria, 2015). Additionally, 
it has been found that reductions in average working times are likely to reduce an economy's 
environmental impacts (Pullinger, 2014). Connected degrowth principles are sharing and 
commons, or “making the commons” (Kallis, 2018), which can generally be defined as different 
forms of shared material and immaterial wealth (Akbulut, 2019a). This involves sharing of work, 
public space, living space, resources and expertise, as well as rules, rights and duties that entail 
pooling and governing shared resources with egalitarian direct democratic processes (Kallis, 
2018). In other words, the commons represent a system of self-governance and processes of shared 
stewardship about things a community possesses and manages together (Helfrich & Bollier, 2015).  
If a successful degrowth transition were to lead to drastic reductions in consumption, 
Sekulova (2015) argues that this would not necessarily have a negative effect on subjective well-
being. Firstly, drawing on Easterlin (2003), non-monetary domains such as health, social capital, 
relational goods, marital status, tend to be more valuable for happiness than monetary ones such 
as material conditions or level of disposable income. Also, Easterlin (1974) found a happiness-
income paradox (now known as the Easterlin paradox), which showed a lack of association 






important to note that this would only have a positive outcome if it involved all of the world’s 
population and not only small portions of the population surrounded by others who are wealthy, 
resembling an economic crisis. If done collectively, individuals would adapt and grow accustomed 
to material conditions as they tend to, and no longer engage in social comparison (Sekulova, 2015). 
This conscious minimization of wasteful and resource-intensive consumption can be referred to as 
voluntary simplicity, which also represents a reimagination of ‘the good life’ (Alexander, 2015b). 
This means seeking non-materialistic sources of satisfaction and meaning, like more time with 
family, community or social engagements, political participation, spiritual exploration, relaxation 
etc. Albeit, this shift in cultural values may be difficult in societies dominated by materialistic 
principles, and though degrowth calls for a voluntary transition, it may end up being imposed 
through economic recession or collapse (Alexander, 2015b). While a degrowth paradigm has never 
been globally realized, it is important to note that whichever pathway is chosen will inevitably be 
complex and challenging. 
 
2.4 Proposals of degrowth 
Various proposed actions have been put forth for how degrowth transitions could be 
conceived around the world. Rigon (2017) notes that the urgency for change means it will need to 
occur within the existing institutions of society, while greater institutional change can be carried 
out along the way. The author also argues that policies will vary by scale and level of radicalism, 
that some may explicitly acknowledge degrowth principles while others may be designed with 
different intentions but still contribute to degrowth, and that many policies will only make sense 
in certain contexts. Under the degrowth lens, Cosme et al. (2017) identified three broad degrowth 






both within and between countries, and (3) promote the transition from a materialistic to a 
convivial and participatory society. These goals are discussed in sections 2.4.1, 2.4.2 and 2.4.3, 
respectively. The majority of these proposals have a national focus of implementation, followed 
by local, and international. Further, the majority present a top-down approach and require direct 
control by governments, which highly contradicts the degrowth discourse of voluntary and 
democratic change (Cosme et al., 2017). The authors also found that degrowth academic literature 
is more focused on social equity than on environmental sustainability. 
2.4.1 Reduce the environmental impact of human activities  
 
Cosme et al. (2017) found the most common proposals to reduce the environmental impacts 
of human activities were to reduce material and energy consumption, create incentives for local 
production and consumption, and promote changes in consumption patterns (Table 2.1). One of 
the greater changes a degrowth transition requires is a new economy. This encompasses 
ecologically-bounded economic activity in order to comply with the ecological limits of Earth, a 
stable and resilient economy, equality, and work as a part of participation in the life of society 
(Jackson, 2015). Policies and institutional changes that could aid the economic transition include: 
the abolishment and substitution of GDP as an indicator of human and ecological well-being; 
work-sharing; a universal income or guaranteed public services; a redirection of public 
investments from the private sector to the public, and from infrastructure and activities that 
increase productivity to expenditures that green the economy and reclaim the commons; and 









Table 2.1 Analysis of degrowth proposals for Goal 1: Reduce the environmental impact of human activities (Cosme et al., 2017) 
Topic Degrowth proposal 
Consumption Promote changes in consumption patterns 
Tax consumption 
Limit/regulate advertising 
Decrease the number of appliances and volume of goods used or consumed per household 
Ecological 
conservation 
Promote the restoration of ecosystems 
Finance funds and projects for the conservation of biodiversity 
Promote the use of local sources of water (rainwater, greywater) to reduce dependence on 
large infrastructure and improve the quality of freshwater ecosystems 
Infrastructure Redirect investments away from infrastructure in fast and car-based models of transport to 
slow-mode ones 
Create a moratorium on new infrastructure (e.g. nuclear plants, highways, dams) 
Pollution Put caps on CO2 emissions, tradable or non-tradable 
Tax environmental externalities  
Certify organic farming including CO2 emission reduction goals 
Reduce waste generation 
Production Reduce production (large-scale, resource intensive)  
Promote organic farming/sustainable agriculture  
Introduce simpler technologies  
Create regulatory bans for very harmful activities/technologies (e.g. nuclear energy)  
Make more green investments  
Promote eco-efficiency  
Resource use Put caps on resource use and extraction (tradable or non-tradable) 
Tax the extraction of resources at origin  
Reduce energy consumption  
Reduce material consumption  
Create a moratorium on resource use and extraction  
Make commitments to leave resources in the ground  
Tax resource use 
Promote the use of local sources of rainwater and greywater  
Remove harmful subsidies for resource extraction  
Invest in more renewable energy  
Promote the compact city form of urban planning  
Trade Promote strong social and environmental provisions in trade agreements  
Limit trade distances and volume  
Create incentives for local production and consumption  
Reduce the number of scientific conferences  
Regulate the tourism industry  








2.4.2 Redistribute income and wealth both within and between countries  
 
Cosme et al. (2017) found the most common proposals to redistribute income and wealth 
both within and between countries were to promote community currencies, non-monetary 
exchange systems and alternative credit institutions, promote a fair distribution of resources 
through redistributive policies of income and capital assets, promote work-sharing, create a 
citizen’s income and salary caps (Table 2.2). Institutions in a degrowth transition would guarantee 
minimum health and economic security to all, and limit environmental degradation (Raventós, 
2007). These, and all other proposed shifts to move toward a degrowth paradigm, could be made 
acceptable, successful and rewarding through the implementation of Serge Latouche’s call for a 
“decolonization of the imaginary” (Latouche, 2009), which can be defined as “an active process 
of liberating thought, desires and institutions from the logic of growth, productivism and 
accumulation for accumulation's sake” (Kallis, 2011). This call is based on the work of Cornelius 
Castoriadis (1987) which critiques the emergence of the idea that the “unlimited growth of 
production and of the productive forces is in fact the central objective of human existence”. 
Latouche (2015) refers to this decolonization of the imaginary as a detoxification and a process of 













Table 2.2 Analysis of degrowth proposals for Goal 2: Redistribute income and wealth both within and between countries (Cosme et al., 2017) 
Topic Degrowth proposal 
Access to goods and 
services 
Create a basic/citizen’s income  
Promote community currencies, non-monetary exchange systems, and alternative credit 
institutions  
Improve social security and investment in public goods to guarantee equal access to 
goods and services, and thereby protect people from poverty and exclusion  
Decrease unemployment  
Turn banking into a public service  
Create a job guarantee  
Promote the recognition and management of common goods  
Eliminate debt-based money  
Equity Promote a fair redistribution of resources through redistributive policies of income and 
capital assets  
Implement redistributive taxation schemes  
Promote the shift of costs from labour to capital  
Encourage the breaking up of large corporations to avoid monopolies  
Encourage the reform of corporate charters and promote new ownership patterns  
Encourage the breaking up and decentralisation of banks and financial institutions
  
Create salary caps  
Tax international capital movement  
Tighten the control on tax havens  
Global governance Put a price on environmental and social externalities  
Prepare for long-term non-growth after the period of growth for developing countries
  




Promote work-sharing and job-sharing  
Create more employment in key sectors  
Provide sufficient work opportunities  
Encourage small, local enterprises  
 
2.4.3 Promote the transition from a materialistic to a convivial and participatory 
society  
Cosme et al. (2017) found the most common proposals to promote the transition from a 
materialistic to a convivial and participatory society were to promote downshifted lifestyles, 








Table 2.3 Analysis of degrowth proposals for Goal 3: Promote the transition from a materialistic to a convivial and participatory society (Cosme 
et al., 2017) 
Topic Degrowth proposal 
Community building, education 
and value change  
Create funds to finance low economic cost, high welfare public investments
  
Promote a value change  
Invest in the restoration and strengthening of local communities  
Strengthen common possession regimes and customary institutions through 
their formal recognition by external actors  
Introduce and incentivise education on ecological/social limits and 
sustainability in various educational and training establishments  
Promote the preservation of ancient knowledge, language, and techniques
  
Democracy and participation Decentralise and deepen democratic institutions  
Promote alternative political systems and capabilities to provide them  
Create caps on political and electoral spending to allow equal participation 
chances  
Promote regeneration of fundamental democratic institutions to incorporate 
degrowth-related spatial, temporal, and value dimensions  
Free time Promote shared living spaces (with shared chores)  
Reduce working hours 
Voluntary simplicity and 
downshifting 
Promote frugal, downshifted lifestyles  
Explore the value of unpaid and informal activity  
Devise new measures to track improvements in social welfare  
 
There exist grassroots initiatives that embody the cultural shift representative of degrowth 
that are aside from institutional changes. For instance, back-to-the-landers are people who choose 
to move from the city to the countryside to pursue agrarian or artisan lifestyles without prior 
experience, as a way to go against materialist mainstream culture (Calvário & Otero, 2015). Their 
aim is to transition their lifestyles toward ecological sustainability but adopting simpler, self-
sufficient, autonomous, and close-to-nature ways of living (Calvário & Otero, 2015). These 
lifestyles are often connected by organic small-scale farming, relocalization of production and 
consumption, alternative economies and networks, all of which are necessary changes for a 
degrowth transition. Community currencies are suggested as unconventional mediums of 






convertible local currencies) (Dittmer, 2015). This strategy can be seen as intentionally leaving 
growth-based society while also engaging in community-building, advancing alternative values, 
and facilitating alternative livelihoods (Dittmer, 2015). A similar proposal associated with 
degrowth values is a shift to cooperative organizational structures, defined by the International Co-
operative Alliance as ‘autonomous associations of persons united voluntarily to meet their 
common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned and 
democratically-controlled enterprise’ (Johanisova, Suriñach Padilla & Parry, 2015). ewdsx 
There also exist several proposals to address happiness in a degrowth transition. Firstly, 
the reduction of work hours is considered here due to findings of increased happiness and life-
satisfaction associated with part-time work. This is referred to as work-sharing, and more deeply 
represents an increase of free time and space devoted to non-monetary, reciprocal, communal and 
other activities that one considers meaningful (Sekulova, 2015). Second, the recommendation of 
basic and maximum income is revisited, whereby income inequality would be reduced and 
subjective-well-being could improve due to the associated “decline in rivalry” (Sekulova, 2015). 
These two policies could aid in eliminating poverty without relying on growth (i.e. redistributing 
rather than growing), by being guaranteed, unconditional and universal (Alexander, 2015a). 
Degrowth also advocates for a reduction in car-dependence and other fast transport modes for 
various reasons including, the fact that spending hours in a motorized vehicle has a negative effect 
on happiness; traffic congestion and associated environmental degradation. This could be possible 
if individuals shifted to public transit use and chose work placements based on proximity 
(Sekulova, 2015). Latouche’s decolonization of the imaginary would additionally have a positive 
effect on happiness by shifting materialistic values to intrinsic ones such as altruism, which are 






would fundamentally alter the life of most people in the global North. However, as D’Alisa et al. 
(2015) plainly put it, this would ideally be a voluntary transition – a ‘planned economic 
contraction’ – but it may end up being a transition imposed on people by way of recession or even 
collapse, an idea that is revisited below. 
 
2.5 Addressing barriers to degrowth 
[...] legal, political and economic structures will never reflect a post-growth ethics of 
 macro-economic sufficiency until a post-consumerist ethics of micro-economics  
 sufficiency is embraced and mainstreamed at the cultural level. 
          — Samuel Alexander, 2013 
 
The propositions for degrowth come with many obstacles. Institutionally speaking, Büchs 
and Koch (2019) describe a growth ‘lock in’ and state that a transition to degrowth would require 
fundamental social, economic, political, cultural and technological changes, which are difficult to 
achieve through political means. One of the more substantial discussions about the feasibility of 
degrowth is whether the transition can occur within capitalism. Akbulut (2019b) discusses the 
imperative of economic growth as more than an economic and social quest for economic gain, but 
also as a major component in “securing and reproducing social support/consent for existing 
political-economic structures that systematically create and perpetuate inequality.” The author 
discusses the important role of the nation-state and the Gramscian concept of hegemony in 
perpetuating the growth imperative. Through material and ideological practices, hegemony is 
realized by modern states through efforts to obtain societal consent, accompanied by coercion, to 






representation as “the bearer and deliverer of society’s collective interest”, whereby its existence 
and rule is justified. This representation of unity in turn allows for the neglect of internal class-
based distributional conflicts and does so without threatening the status of the upper class 
(Akbulut, 2019b). Therefore, Akbulut discusses two challenges for the politics of degrowth that 
have not been widely addressed in the literature: that there are likely interrelated political and 
economic incentives to maintain the growth imperative, grounded in state hegemony; and that 
growth is deeply ingrained as a collective goal in state-society relations which may be difficult to 
disregard. Moreover, these interdependent challenges prove even more difficult because the 
majority of degrowth proposals require active intervention and/or involvement of the state 
(Abkulut, 2019b), as seen above. Kallis et al. (2018) warn that due to these established interests 
and power relations, a degrowth transition is politically unlikely.  
Degrowth requires an ecological-material and political break, as well as a cultural-
symbolic one (Akbulut, 2019b). As a Western idea, degrowth proposes the decrease in income and 
material comfort for the global North. The idea of having less money and possessions, and having 
to ‘lower’ their comfort level is seen as a sacrifice, which represents a significant psychological 
barrier to supporting degrowth (Abdallah & Thompson, 2008). Some concerns surrounding the 
possible negative wellbeing implications from the decrease of material living standards of a 
degrowth transition are discussed by Büchs and Koch (2019). They address concerns about 
happiness and life satisfaction, considering that degrowth would challenge people’s mindsets, 
identities and life goals. This includes, for instance, ideas of justice, freedom, private property, 
individual responsibility, social progress, personal status and success through careers, rising 
income and consumption, etc. Essentially, these individualistic ideals would need to shift as 






Büchs and Koch bring forth the Easterlin paradox which concludes that happiness does not depend 
on (rising) GDP per capita, and suggest the possibility that people could adapt their preferences to 
lower material living standards in the longer term if prospects for future improvements are 
regarded as very low. 
Büchs and Koch also address concerns for health and life expectancy, which are negatively 
impacted specifically during short-term recessions (they give examples mental health 
deterioration, increases in smoking, alcohol consumption and suicide in places like Russia and 
Eastern Europe). Though recessions are not comparable to degrowth, they find that how the 
decreases in resources would impact life expectancy remains unclear. While the goal is for the 
transition is to not be experienced as welfare loss, there is skepticism of the likelihood of 
individuals both voluntarily choosing, and more so, politically fighting for simpler and more frugal 
lives, especially when these individuals come from cultures that seek ever-higher levels of income 
and consumption (Kallis, 2011; Hamilton & Denniss, 2005). Several researchers address the 
necessary distinction between needs and luxuries for addressing wellbeing under a degrowth 
transition (e.g. Koch, Buch-Hansen & Fritz, 2017; Büchs & Koch, 2019). This is a significant 
(Western) cultural obstacle that needs to be overcome.  
In the same realm of thought, Buch-Hansen and Koch (2019) discuss the limited popular 
support for caps on wealth and/or income. They suggest it may be because the proposals are not 
fully defined yet and therefore are hard to envision and implement. They also assert that any of 
these proposals would be met with strong opposition from wealthy individuals. Further, the authors 
discuss arguments against caps; whereby emigration of high-skilled employees would increase, 
and the caps would likely lead to capital flight. Moreover, Hennighausen and Heinemann (2014) 






There have been expressed concerns that economic contraction would lead to 
unemployment and inequality, and social conflict inherent in rapid societal change (Büchs & Koch, 
2019), which would be opposed by the poor. The aforementioned proposals for work-sharing, 
basic income and job guarantee have been conceived to address these concerns, though it does not 
help that growth and wellbeing are currently being regarded as strongly coupled by the majority 
of politicians and the population. With this in mind, it should be acknowledged that degrowth is 
strongly committed to promoting well-being and quality of life (Natale et al., 2016), and that 
degrowth can maintain or even improve human wellbeing (Büchs & Koch, 2019). Public opinion 
is among the numerous barriers to the degrowth movement and needs to be further understood if 
there is to be any progress toward sustainable human existence.  
In areas with a representative democracy, like Canada, the public elects like-minded 
representatives with the expectation that they will reflect and deliver what it wants in policy, and 
follow preferences as they change (Wlezien & Soroka, 2016). The degrowth movement needs to 
be democratic and collective, and is therefore completely dependent on public support.  
Accordingly, it is extremely important to evaluate public opinion on the subject, as well as the 
factors that influence it, in order to assess the potential for implementing degrowth policies. Not 
only does political choice play an important role in influencing social outcomes, the feasibility of 
policy implementation is dependent on these attitudes and the willingness to accept change (Drews 
et al., 2018). A report based on 45,435 respondents around the world found a global median of 
67% saying they expect that reducing the effects of climate change will require people to make 
major changes in their lifestyles, though they did not specify in which ways (Stokes, Wike & Carle, 
2015). A 2016 study by Bernauer and McGrath found that many respondents prefer to be 






support top-down active climate policy. The authors noted that ambitious climate policy is 
infeasible without strong public support because it will inevitably affect most citizens. It is 
therefore difficult to envision what to expect in terms of opinions on lifestyle changes that 
degrowth proposes. Aside from policy, social movements have been extremely important in 
pushing degrowth ideas into public debate. For example, degrowth as a social movement in France 
only emerged from protests for car-free cities, food cooperatives and anti-advertising (Demaria et 
al., 2013).  
 
2.6 Public opinions on the term degrowth 
While there has been research conducted about public opinions on associated topics of 
degrowth, there has not yet been a study looking at the public opinions of what degrowth would 
entail, and the willingness for what it proposes. There have been some studies done on initial 
perceptions of the term degrowth. Several arguments against the use of the term have been 
presented. For example, Drews and Antal (2016) state that initial exposure to a sociopolitical 
concept creates bias in later phases of political thinking, information processing, opinions and 
decisions, and add that negative snap judgements can create a very unfavorable starting position 
for the degrowth argument in the debate about the paradigm of economic growth. The authors 
explain that most average people will view economic growth as something good, connecting it to 
positive ideas such as prosperity, employment development, economic and social improvement, 
higher wages and well-being; while the term degrowth may infer crisis, recession, lower salaries 
and job losses. On the other hand, several arguments in favor of the term have also been presented. 
For example, the use of a provocative slogan raises attention as mainstream politicians continue to 






the current paradigm (Daly, 2013; Drews & Antal, 2016). Because imaging a different future is 
essential to the movement, degrowth clearly opposes the current economic system and criticizes 
“the automatic association of growth with better” (D’Alisa et al., 2015; Drews & Antal, 2016). 
 
2.7 Public opinions on growth versus the environment 
Much of the research on public opinions on the growth-versus-environment debate has not 
included the word degrowth in the survey process precisely because it has been found that initial 
public perceptions of the term are important in forming opinions about the subject. Studies have 
found that the majority of respondents favored the happy medium, green growth (Drews & Reese, 
2018; Drews & van den Bergh, 2016; Kaplowitz et al., 2011). While green growth as a post-growth 
scenario would also require a social transition, it would be far closer to a business-as-usual scenario 
for much of the world population. Nevertheless, it currently lacks the necessary technological 
innovation (Ančić & Domazet, 2015).  
Degrowth depends on “widening and deepening of the process of democratization”, which 
is reliant on the “existence and formation of specific value orientations” (Ančić & Domazet, 2015). 
Accordingly, in their study of 18 European countries, Ančić and Domazet (2015) used several 
indicators assessing value orientation (e.g. personal willingness to make a material sacrifice in 
order to protect the environment), pro-environmental behavior intentions, and attitudes on the 
tradeoff of economic growth and the environment. They found that respondents are not very 
willing to make personal material sacrifice, and that pro-environmental behavior is focused more 
on low-impact actions for reducing emissions, such as recycling, rather than high-impact actions 
like living car-free (see Wynes & Nicholas, 2017). The authors also found that on average, only 






that public knowledge about economic growth and its consequences is inadequate, and may be 
related to the lack of concern for the current global crises. 
While excluding the term degrowth but incorporating the rationale of degrowth 
conceptualization, very few similar studies have been conducted to assess public opinions on the 
growth-versus-environment debate, namely in Europe, the United States and China. A study by 
Xu and Li (2018) found that in the United states, 60.5% of people regard economic growth as a 
priority, while in China, 46.5% regard the environment as a priority, noting that environmental 
degradation is a serious problem in China. In a study representative of the Spanish population, 
Drews & van den Bergh (2016) found that the majority of respondents believe that economic 
growth allows for job creation, life satisfaction, public services and economic stability. Moreover, 
two-thirds of respondents believe that economic growth in rich countries may stop at some point 
in the future, while one-third believe it will be never-ending. In the same study, when choosing a 
position regarding the relationship between economic growth and the environment, more than one-
third of respondents support ignoring or stopping economic growth, while the rest favor the 
prioritization of economic growth or green growth (Drews & van den Bergh, 2016).  
Noting that economic growth is primarily questioned in rich, industrialized countries, 
Drews et al. (2018) studied data collected from large multinational survey projects in Europe and 
the United States. The authors looked at whether people see the relationship between 
environmental protection and economic growth as compatible or contradictory. They reported only 
27% of respondents perceiving the two as incompatible, responding positively to the statement 
“Economic growth always harms the environment”, while the majority of respondents who view 
the two as contradictory also believe that environmental protection contributes to economic 






prioritize environmental protection over growth, but this finding should be cautioned due to similar 
attitudinal inconsistencies and limited understanding of key concepts and issues. The authors 
suggest that public opinions may be considerably unstable and more easily influenced by mediums 
such as communication.     
 
2.8 Public opinions on degrowth-related policies 
Many researchers have also looked at public opinions on some degrowth policy proposals 
individually, though not linking the policy to degrowth in their studies. It is important to note that 
these policy considerations are directed toward high income countries. While limiting this review 
to the policies looked at in this study, the proposals to limit trade, ban new infrastructure and 
individually tax resource use are relatively new, therefore I am unaware of any existing literature 
pertaining to public opinions on these policies. 
The implementation of a basic income has been a topic of discussion for economists, 
politicians, academics and the general public all over the world for many years, but still, it remains 
a topic of debate (Raventós, 2007). Concerns of technical, financial and ethical viability are met 
with concerns for justice, poverty and inequality (Raventós, 2007). Some research has shown 
relatively high levels of support, though varying across countries (e.g. Parolin & Siöland, 2020; 
Roosma & van Oorschot, 2020). Parolin and Siöland (2020) found that individuals with left 
political ideology and those in countries where social spending is low are more likely to support 
it. Roosma and van Oorschot (2020) similarly found individuals on the political left to be more 
likely to support basic income, as well as younger individuals, those who are in a more vulnerable 






Hennighausen and Heinemann (2014) looked at support for progressive taxation and found 
the majority to approve such a system. The approval was largely based on the individual’s fairness 
considerations and beliefs in the role of effort for economic success (i.e. that people need to 
“deserve” or “earn” any income they receive), as well as their position in the income distribution. 
Reimers (2009) also found their participants to favor a progressive tax regime. The author found 
that support for progressive taxation is affected by the way the scenario is framed (i.e. in terms of 
income retained versus tax paid), and by describing the amount of the tax in percentages versus 
amounts. People preferred the percentages of income.  
 Public opinions on the reduction of work hours vary highly. For instance, those with higher 
incomes have been found to prefer a reduction in workload, likely due to a more secure standard 
of living, while the opposite is true for those with lower incomes who likely cannot afford a 
decrease in income (Stier & Lewin-Epstein, 2003). However, those motivated by a desire for high 
incomes have been found to want more hours (Reynolds, 2004). Additional factors that impact 
support for a reduction of work hours include age, education, number of hours worked per week, 
occupation, where older workers, those with a higher education, and those who work more hours 
per week are likely to be overworked and prefer a reduction in hours (Golden & Gebreselassie, 
2007). 
 
2.9 Determinants of environmental values  
 Most public opinion studies are accompanied by their socio-demographic determinants. In 
order to understand public opinion on a subject, it is helpful to assess the factors that influence 
individual opinions. Doing so can identify potential openings or obstacles to achieving social 






it could be thought of as an environmental value in itself. Below are the potential socio-
demographic factors that could have an effect on support for degrowth.  
2.9.1 Age 
Many researchers have found that environmental values to decline with age (e.g. Franzen 
& Meyer, 2010; Hawcroft & Milfont, 2010), potentially because of recent increases in 
environmental education, changing norms in concern for the environment (Whitmarsh, 2011). A 
separate argument postulates that younger people are less integrated in the dominant social order, 
which is sometimes seen as threatened by environmental policies that require changing values and 
behavior, therefore it is logical for younger people to support environmental reform (Van Liere & 
Dunlap, 1980). This would mean age should have a negative effect on policy support, independent 
of environmental values. Other researchers have found age to either have a positive effect or mixed 
effects on environmental attitudes (e.g. Franzen & Vogl, 2013; Shen & Saijo, 2008; Wiernik et al., 
2013, Xu & Li, 2018). One reason for this could be that younger people have been found to have 
more faith in technological advancement as the answer to environmental issues, and therefore feel 
no urgency to change (Benn, 2004).  
2.9.2 Education 
Educational attainment has consistently been found to have a positive effect on 
environmental concern (e.g. Dunlap et al., 2000; Ejelöv & Nilsson, 2020; Franzen & Meyer, 2010; 
Franzen & Vogl 2013; Tomaselli et al., 2019, Xu & Li, 2018), also increases choice of environment 
over economic progress (Dietz, Stern & Guagnano, 1998), and increases the view that excessive 







Income has been shown to have a positive effect on environmental values (e.g. Franzen & 
Meyer, 2010; Franzen & Vogl 2013; Shen & Saijo, 2008; Tomaselli et al., 2019), suggesting the 
two are not independent of each other. One possible reason for this is discussed by Van Liere an 
Dunlap (1980), which draws on Maslow's (1970) hierarchy of needs, whereby upper and middle 
classes are able to achieve their basic needs and are therefore free to put their energy toward other 
issues, like concerning themselves with the state of the environment. Another interesting argument 
is made by Morrison et al. (1972) and discussed by Van Liere an Dunlap (1980) who state “the 
middle and upper classes are more likely to have experienced pleasant residential, work, and 
recreational environments, and consequently are more concerned about the deterioration of the 
physical environment”. Effects of income on concern for the environment have also been mixed, 
negative or non-significant (Dunlap et al., 2000; Ejelöv & Nilsson, 2020, Xu & Li, 2018). One of 
the main arguments put forth here is that because the lower class is typically at the frontline of 
poor environmental conditions, be it living and/or working in highly polluted areas, having access 
to poor recreational facilities (Buttel & Flinn, 1978), or suffering disproportionately from the 
adverse effects of climate change (Islam & Winkel, 2017), they are expected to be concerned with 
the environment. Moreover, when speaking on the environmentalism of the poor, Martinez-Alier 
(2014) states that “in the many resource extraction and waste disposal conflicts in history and 
today, the poor are often on the side of the preservation of nature against business firms and the 
state”. The author adds that people will act when the environment is a source of livelihood, and 






2.9.4 Employment status  
Employment status has been found to be almost irrelevant to environmental concern 
(Franzen & Meyer, 2010; Shen & Saijo, 2008; Torgler & García-Valiñas, 2007), while some 
researchers have not even included the variable in their analyses (e.g. Franzen & Vogl 2013).  
2.9.5 Gender  
 Women have been consistently found to have greater environmental values (e.g. Franzen 
& Meyer, 2010; Franzen & Vogl, 2013; Torgler & García-Valiñas, 2007), potentially due to 
“traditional gender socialization, cultural norms, the women's roles as caregivers and nurturers” 
(Torgler & García-Valiñas, 2007). 
2.9.6 Political orientation  
Left-wing political orientation has consistently been shown to positively correspond with: 
environmental values (e.g. Dunlap et al., 2000; Tomaselli et al., 2019); belief in the limits to growth 
(Drews & van den Bergh, 2016); indifference about growth (Drews & van den Bergh, 2017; and 
support for climate and energy policies (Mildenberger et al., 2017). Dunlap (1975) puts forth three 
possible reasons for the division when noting the conservative pro-business stance, the greater 
opposition to “big government”, and suspicion of drastic change, stating that conservatives will 
oppose environmental policies because: “(1) the costs involved, they are generally opposed by 
business and industry (2) they often entail an extension of governmental activities and control over 







2.9 Social rationality  
Etzioni (1988) discusses the role of social collectivities (e.g. local communities, ethnic 
groups, and social movements) as major decision-making units that provide the context in which 
individual decisions are made. The author states that the qualities of most decision-making and 
deliberation — the collection of information, its processing, the drawing of inferences, and 
formation of judgements — are deeply affected and can be explained to a significant extent by 
collective processes and structures (institutions and organizations). The role of social collectivities 
is compared to the role of individuals in neoclassical economics, whereby individuals are assumed 
to be the decision makers, independent of historical and societal factors. The neoclassical paradigm 
is described here as utilitarian and rationalistic-individualistic. Instead, another paradigm has been 
put forth by Etzioni, the I&We paradigm: It sees individuals as able to act rationally and on their 
own, advancing their self or “I”, but their ability to do so is deeply affected by how well they are 
anchored within a sound community and sustained by a firm moral and emotive personal 
underpinning — a community they perceive as theirs, as a “We”, rather than an imposed, 
restraining “they”.  Etzioni parallels subjects studied individually and one at a time, to studying 
the direction a fish swims after isolating one from its school; the individual must “perform the 
assigned cognitive tasks and render decisions without the cues they typically draw on — those 
provided by the social collectivities of which they are members”. By using a survey, respondents 
are isolated and only have the opportunity to think as individuals. Relatedly, Dietz, Fitzgerald & 
Shwom (2005) critique the use of surveys in relation to environmental values, explaining that the 
influence of values on decision making depends on a decision context that allows for reflection, 






several different ways, Dietz et al. say that we tend to use them in three senses in everyday 
language: what something is worth, opinions about that worth, and moral principles. Values are 
important to consider here, as they are argued to influence individual decisions, that inevitably 
shape individual, and ultimately group behavior (Dietz et al., 2005). Relatedly, Vatn (2006) 
discusses the role of institutions in the formation and articulation of value; the author defines 
institutions as the conventions, norms and legal rules of a society, that provide expectations, 
stability and meaning essential to human existence and coordination, and regularize life, support 
values and protect and produce interests. Preferences and values can be articulated through, for 
example, markets, voting, and different forms of deliberative institutions like consensus 
conferences and citizens’ juries, which in turn assert the role of the individual while also fostering 
social rationality (Vatn, 2006). With the ultimate goal of implementing viable degrowth-related 
policies, the role of institutions should be considered as they “define the conventions, norms and 
legal rules that structure relationships between people concerning their access to and use of 
environmental resources” (Vatn, 2006). 
 
2.10 Gaps in knowledge  
As the term degrowth has only recently emerged, there are very few studies on the public 
opinions of degrowth, and these are limited in scale, locations and cultures researched. Moreover, 
existing studies look at public opinions on economic growth, prosperity, and their relation to the 
environment, or on degrowth related policies individually, but they do not look at public opinions 
on degrowth itself (as a movement). By integrating several degrowth policy proposals and the idea 
of a degrowth transition in Canada, this study aims to find a more holistic understanding of public 










3.1 Introduction  
The current atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration is unprecedented over the last three 
million years (Willeit et al., 2019). The science is clear: Earth’s atmosphere and oceans have 
warmed, snow and ice volume have diminished, sea levels have risen, and the concentrations of 
greenhouse gases have increased (IPCC, 2013). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), the international body for assessing the science related to climate change, has projected 
outcomes concerning human health that could affect the status of millions of people through 
increases in malnutrition, increased deaths, disease and injury due to heat waves, fires, storms and 
droughts, increased vector-borne diseases, and more (IPCC, 2013). The 2015 Paris Agreement 
established the international goal of limiting global temperature increase to well below 2°C above 
pre-industrial levels (period 1850-1900) and to aim for 1.5°C to reduce the risks and impacts of 
climate change (UNFCCC, 2015). However, the United Nations’ Emissions Gap Report 2018 
confirmed that global efforts to decrease emissions have been inadequate thus far.  
For decades, scholars have warned about human impacts on the environment, cautioning 
us on our exhaustive use of resources and the implications of our seemingly innate need to grow 
as individuals, societies and nations (e.g. Carson, 1962; Daly, 1991, 1996; Georgescu-Roegen, 
1971, 1975; Hirsch, 1976; Meadows et al., 1972). As the quest for growth continues, many still 
face poverty and inequality. The field of Ecological Economics has developed considerably over 
the past century, notably delivering critiques of economic growth. Researchers have argued that 






development and green growth will not adequately address the climate crisis (e.g. Hickel & Kallis, 
2019). Many have asserted that economic growth is not compatible with social and ecological 
sustainability (e.g. D’Alisa et al., 2015; Kallis et al., 2018; Kosoy et al., 2012; Martinez-Alier, 
2009). One of the more popular examples of investigation into economic growth was Donella 
Meadows and colleagues in The Limits to Growth, in which they wrote about growth trends in 
world population, industrialization, pollution, food production, and resource depletion. They 
concluded that the biophysical limits to growth would be reached within a century if these trends 
are maintained (Meadows et al., 1972). The authors offered a second outcome, in which economic 
and ecological sustainability were to be met by altering the above trends in order to reach a ‘global 
equilibrium’ whereby every individual has equal opportunity and their basic needs are met. Fifty 
years later, we find ourselves moving closer and closer to the former outcome, as current global 
resource use follows the “collapse by 2050” scenario presented in the report (Jackson & Webster, 
2016). Human socio-economic activities have led to stark changes in the Earth system (Steffen et 
al., 2015b), meaning that economic growth is one of the main drivers for rising emissions (e.g. 
Peters et al., 2017; Zhang et al., 2014). Economic growth remains one of the main goals for every 
nation (United Nations, 2019), despite evidence that continued economic growth is not a 
sustainable development trajectory (e.g. Jackson, 2009), as it would perpetuate dependence on 
fossil fuels, extractivism and exploitation. It has been argued that economic contraction is 
unavoidable due to natural limits, therefore any research on managing and prospering without 
growth is of great value. 
To address climate change and many other issues associated with growth, degrowth has 
been proposed as an alternative to the current growth paradigm. While degrowth is stated as being 






it is commonly defined as “an equitable downscaling of production and consumption that increases 
human well-being and enhances ecological conditions at the local and global level, in the short 
and long term” (Schneider, Kallis & Martinez-Alier, 2010). At the core of the degrowth movement 
are numerous interconnected ideas and beliefs about how to make the world a better place for all 
living beings. In their review, Cosme et al. (2017) identified 3 concrete degrowth goals with related 
policy proposals. The first goal they describe is to reduce the environmental impact of human 
activities through policies that reduce material and energy consumption, create incentives for local 
production and consumption, and promote changes in consumption patterns, etc. (e.g. tax 
consumption, pollution and resource use; create moratoria on new infrastructure, and resource use 
and extraction). The second degrowth goal is to redistribute income and wealth both within and 
between countries through policies that promote community currencies, non-monetary exchange 
systems and alternative credit institutions, promote a fair distribution of resources through 
redistributive policies of income and capital assets, promote work-sharing, and create a citizen’s 
income and salary caps. The third goal is to promote the transition from a materialistic to a 
convivial and participatory society through policies that promote downshifted lifestyles, reduce 
working hours, and explore the value of unpaid and informal activity.  
The political and economic feasibility of a degrowth transition has been well addressed and 
challenged in academic literature (e.g. Büchs & Koch, 2019; Tokic, 2012; van den Bergh, 2011), 
whereas the social and cultural feasibility has been addressed much less. Among shifting economic 
goals and changing values, a cultural revolution is needed for degrowth to gain momentum 
(D’Alisa et al., 2014; Latouche, 2009). The degrowth movement arose from the global North, from 
and for individuals who enjoy comparatively high levels of objective and subjective wellbeing 






income and consumption. A democratically led transition whereby individuals would both 
voluntarily choose, and even more, politically fight for simpler and more frugal lives is hard to 
imagine (Buch-Hansen & Koch, 2019), thus representing a substantial cultural obstacle.  
In areas with a representative democracy, like Canada, the public elects like-minded 
representatives with the expectation that they will reflect and deliver what it wants in policy and 
follow preferences as they change (Wlezien & Soroka, 2016). The degrowth movement needs to 
be democratic and collective and is therefore completely dependent on public support. 
Accordingly, it is extremely important to evaluate public opinion on the subject, as well as the 
factors that influence it, in order to assess the potential for implementing degrowth policies. Not 
only does political choice play an important role in influencing social outcomes, the feasibility of 
policy implementation is dependent on these attitudes and the willingness to accept change (Drews 
et al., 2018).  
Public opinions on degrowth have scarcely been researched. Much of the associated 
literature has been identified in a ‘growth versus environment’ debate (e.g. Drews & van den 
Bergh, 2016; Tomaselli et al., 2019; Xu & Li, 2018). Findings show that economic growth is 
largely perceived as positive (Tomaselli et al., 2019), that many people view economic growth and 
environmental protection as compatible (Drews et al., 2018), and few people support ignoring or 
stopping economic growth (Drews & van den Bergh, 2016). Contradictory views, attitudinal 
inconsistencies and limited understanding of key concepts and issues have been found in several 
studies (e.g. Drews et al., 2018; Drews et al., 2019; Tomaselli et al., 2019) 
Separately, many have conducted public opinion studies on single policy proposals. For 
example, some research has shown relatively high levels of support for the implementation of a 






Heinemann (2014) looked at support for progressive taxation and found the majority of their 
respondents to approve such a system. Public opinions on the reduction of work hours vary highly. 
For instance, those with higher incomes have been found to prefer a reduction in workload, likely 
due to a more secure standard of living, while the opposite is true for those with lower incomes 
who likely cannot afford a decrease in income (Stier & Lewin-Epstein, 2003). Policy support has 
largely been found to be higher among younger people, the more highly educated, the political 
left, and those with high environmental values (e.g. Golden & Gebreselassie, 2007; Mildenberger 
et al., 2017; Parolin & Siöland, 2020; Roosma & van Oorschot, 2020; Van Liere & Dunlap, 1980). 
However, Ančić and Domazet (2015) found that respondents are not very willing to make personal 
material sacrifice, and that pro-environmental behavior is focused more on low-impact actions for 
reducing emissions, such as recycling, rather than high-impact actions like living car-free (see 
Wynes & Nicholas, 2017).   
Higher environmental values have consistently been associated with women (e.g. Franzen 
& Meyer, 2010; Franzen & Vogl, 2013; Torgler & García-Valiñas, 2007), younger people (e.g. 
Franzen & Meyer, 2010; Hawcroft & Milfont, 2010), the more highly educated (e.g. Dunlap et al., 
2000; Ejelöv & Nilsson, 2020; Franzen & Meyer, 2010; Franzen & Vogl 2013; Tomaselli et al., 
2019, Xu & Li, 2018), those with higher incomes (e.g. Franzen & Meyer, 2010; Franzen & Vogl 
2013; Shen & Saijo, 2008; Tomaselli et al., 2019), and left-wing political orientation (e.g. Dunlap 
et al., 2000; Tomaselli et al., 2019).  
Economic growth is seen as being linked to wellbeing by the majority of politicians and 
the population (Büchs & Koch, 2019). Some concerns surrounding the possible negative wellbeing 
implications from the decrease of material living standards of a degrowth transition are discussed 






considering that degrowth would challenge people’s mindsets, identities and life goals. This 
includes, for instance, ideas of justice, freedom, private property, individual responsibility, social 
progress, personal status and success through careers, and rising income and consumption. 
Essentially, these individualistic ideals would need to shift as degrowth signifies an enhancement 
of community values, equality and sharing across the board. Several researchers address the 
necessary distinction between needs and luxuries for addressing wellbeing under a degrowth 
transition (e.g. Koch, Buch-Hansen & Fritz, 2017; Büchs & Koch, 2019). 
The concept of social rationality is brought in for the policy support section of this study. 
It was conceptualized by Etzioni (1988), who put forth the I&We paradigm: It sees individuals as 
able to act rationally and on their own, advancing their self or “I”, but their ability to do so is 
deeply affected by how well they are anchored within a sound community and sustained by a firm 
moral and emotive personal underpinning — a community they perceive as theirs, as a “We”, 
rather than an imposed, restraining “they”. As such, reflecting on the implications of one’s actions 
– in this context, on other beings and the environment – through a social rationality ‘lens’ has the 
potential to alter initial, individualistic thoughts or opinions.  
Degrowth has a presence in Québec. Yves-Marie Abraham (2019) wrote an article touching 
on the founding of the Québec Movement for a Convivial Degrowth (MQDC: le Mouvement 
Québécois pour une Décroissance Conviviale) in 2007, of which he was a part of. The MQDC is 
comprised of a broad range of activists and academics, and its main objective upon formation was 
to introduce and promote the idea of degrowth in public discourse in Québec through organized 
study groups, workshops, public lectures and seminars to fuel discussion. It is thanks to this 
community that Abraham was able to create and teach the first university course on degrowth in 






one. Since then, degrowth has gained some traction in the province by hosting the 2012 Degrowth 
Conference of the Americas through several Montréal universities, along with degrowth festivals 
in 2018 and the launch of 3 videos on a Radio-Canada channel by a journalist group called “Rad”, 
looking at ideas of degrowth. While not necessarily associated with degrowth per say, Montréal is 
home to many degrowth-oriented projects, including a plan for a complementary currency (a sort 
of local basic income), co-operative projects such as le Bâtiment 7 in Pointe St-Charles, the tool 
library in Villeray, collective repair shops, community gardens, and Eco-villages outside of 
Montréal. Co-operatives are closely tied to degrowth as they share very similar values: voluntary 
and open membership; democratic member control; member economic participation; autonomy 
and independence; commitment to education about the nature and benefits of co-operation; 
cooperation among cooperatives; and concern for the sustainable development of their 
communities (International Co-operative Alliance; Johanisova et al., 2015). So, Montréal and 
Québec are fertile ground for degrowth, but a movement has yet to truly form and affect substantial 
change. 
As the term degrowth has only recently emerged, there are very few studies on the public 
opinions of degrowth, and these are limited in scale, locations and cultures researched. Moreover, 
existing studies look at public opinions on economic growth, prosperity, and their relation to the 
environment, or on degrowth related policies individually, but they do not look at public opinions 
on degrowth itself (as a movement). By integrating several degrowth policy proposals and the idea 
of a degrowth transition in Canada, this study aims to find a more holistic view of public opinions 
on degrowth and contribute to existing literature.  
With the aim of assessing public support for degrowth in Montréal through the use of an 






sample and data collection process and a discussion of the variables. In section 3.3, I provide a 
data analysis section, where I discuss the data set, hypotheses and introduce the procedures for the 
statistical and qualitative analyses. The results section begins with an overview and brief 
discussion of the respondents’ pre-existing environmental values. I then assess the overall policy 
support of the respondents, the effects of social rationality statements, the determinants of policy 
support, the overall support for a degrowth transition in Canada and the determinants for this 
support. Lastly in the results section, I provide a summary of open-ended answers respondents 
provided for not supporting policies. Finally, I provide a discussion and conclusion. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Survey sample and data collection 
 The survey questionnaire was developed in French and English to allow accessibility for 
all Montréal participants, and was completed by 385 Montréal residents over the age of 18. The 
survey was implemented by Dynata, a global online market research firm. The final data were 
collected in March 2020. The average survey completion time was 11 minutes. Participants 
completed questions separated into 4 modules (see Appendix A for the full questionnaire):  
 Module 1: Socio-demographics 
 Module 2: Environmental values 
 Module 3: Support for degrowth policy proposals 
 Module 4: Support for a degrowth transition in Canada 
The administration of a survey was chosen in order to produce large amounts of data in a short 






opinion polls are the dominant method used by politicians, media organizations, interest groups, 
and academic researchers to assess the public will and political views of the mass public, explains 
Berinsky (2017). Notably, the technically correct way to draw a sample that is representative of a 
population is through a process of simple random sampling, where each individual is chosen by 
chance and each has an equal chance of being included, however this is near impossible to achieve 
(Berinsky, 2017). The findings later presented in this study are thus not statistically representative 
of the Montréal population due to Dynata’s nonprobability opt-in panel that inherently excludes 
people who are not using the internet, making the sample non-random. Much of online research is 
conducted using nonprobability samples (Berinsky, 2017), however, valuable information can 
nevertheless be extracted. 
3.2.3 Independent variables  
3.2.3.1 Module 1 
 To examine individual-level variation in public opinions regarding degrowth-related policy 
implementation I used two sets of explanatory variables: socio-demographic variables and 
environmental values. Module 1 included the standard demographic variables used in similar 
studies, including age, income, educational attainment and political orientation (e.g. Drews & van 
den Bergh, 2016; Tomaselli et al., 2019). I did not include gender as a variable, but rather 
represented gender roles through time used for housework, including activities like preparing 
meals, washing dishes, cleaning house, and washing laundry (Rochette, 2016). While gender has 
been shown to affect environmental values, I chose to proxy it because time-use seemed more 
relevant when considering policy support. I also included a variable of participants’ time used to 






Use Survey, and were included in this study as they pertain to the policy proposals included in the 
survey, which will be further discussed below. Table 3.1 reports the descriptive statistics of the 
socio-demographic characteristics of survey respondents and of the Montréal population. The 
distributions of the participants’ time use regarding travel and housework can be visualized in 




              
















Table 3.1 Sociodemographic characteristics of survey respondents and of the Montréal population 
Survey respondents N Mean (SD) or 
Valid % 
Montréal population % 
Age 
   18 to 24  
   25 to 34 
   35 to 44  
   45 to 54  














   18 to 24  
   25 to 34 
   35 to 44  
   45 to 54  








   Under $29,999 
   $30,000 to $59,999 
   $60,000 to $89,999 
   $90,000 to $119,999 
   $120,000 to 149,999 















   Under $29,999 
   $30,000 to $59,999 
   $60,000 to $89,999 
   $90,000 to $119,999 
   $120,000 to 149,999 








Educational attainment  
High school diploma  
Some CEGEP or university 

















High school diploma  
Some CEGEP or university 













Working part-time  









Labour force statusc 
In the labour force 
   Employed 
   Unemployed 
























% of vote by political partyd 
Conservative Party 
Liberal Party 











Average hours per week spent: 
Traveling / commuting  





Average hours per week spent: 
Traveling / commuting  




a Data excludes Canadians 18 years old or less. Source: Statistics Canada, 2016 Census Profile. 
b The educational categories used in this study do not fully correspond those of Statistics Canada. Source: Statistics 
Canada, 2016 Census. 
c The employment status categories used in this study do not fully correspond those of Statistics Canada. Source: 
Statistics Canada, 2016 Census.  
d 2019 federal elections data. The political orientation categories in this study do not correspond to those of Elections 







3.2.3.2 Module 2 
As the second set of explanatory variables, Module 2 included a series of attitudinal statements 
in order to gauge the pre-existing attitudes and environmental values of the sample. This module 
consisted of 6 Likert-type statements on a scale from 1-5. The first inquired about respondents’ 
concern for climate change on a scale from ‘Not at all concerned’ to ‘Extremely concerned’, a 
variable that has been used in most studies looking environmental values (e.g. Leiserowitz, 2006; 
Geiger & Swim, 2016). The following four statements were taken from La Trobe and Acott (2000) 
and were put on a scale from Strongly disagree (1) to Strongly agree (5). They read:   
 A change in basic attitudes and values is necessary in order to solve environmental 
problems. 
 Technology can overcome any environmental problems.  
 Natural resources should be used primarily to provide for basic needs rather than material 
wealth.  
 Humans are presently interfering too much with the natural environment.  
The last statement was inspired by Drews and van den Bergh (2016), which was put on the above 
Likert scale and read:  
 The highest priority should be given to protecting the environment, even if it hurts the 
economy.  
 In order to avoid redundant information by using each of these variables, I created an index 
of environmental values to be used as a single predictor variable in the regression analysis. First, 
I reversed the order of the scale for the statement “Technology can overcome any environmental 






participant’s response so that they were left with one single number on a scale from 1-5 
representing their environmental values.  
3.2.3.3 Exclusion of variables from regression analysis  
To avoid information redundancy through the inclusion of environmental values in the 
regression models, three variables were excluded from analysis. First, educational attainment has 
consistently been found to have a positive effect on environmental concern (e.g. Dunlap et al., 
2000; Ejelöv & Nilsson, 2020; Franzen & Meyer, 2010; Franzen & Vogl 2013; Tomaselli et al., 
2019, Xu & Li, 2018). Educational attainment also increases choice of environment over economic 
progress (Dietz, Stern & Guagnano, 1998), and increases the view that excessive attention is given 
to economic growth (Drews & van den Bergh, 2016). Therefore, education should have no effect 
on policy support independent of environmental values and was excluded in analysis. 
Second, employment status has been found to be almost irrelevant to environmental 
concern (Franzen & Meyer, 2010; Shen & Saijo, 2008; Torgler & García-Valiñas, 2007), while 
some researchers have not included the variable in their analyses at all (e.g. Franzen & Vogl 2013). 
With this, I excluded employment status from my analysis and consider respondents’ income 
representative of their economic situation. 
Third, left-wing political orientation has consistently been shown to positively correspond 
with: high environmental values (e.g. Dunlap et al., 2000; Tomaselli et al., 2019); belief in the 
limits to growth (Drews & van den Bergh, 2016); indifference about growth (Drews & van den 
Bergh, 2017; and support for climate and energy policies (Mildenberger et al., 2017). Dunlap 
(1975) puts forth three possible reasons for the division when noting the conservative pro-business 
stance, the greater opposition to “big government”, and suspicion of drastic change, stating that 






generally opposed by business and industry, (2) they often entail an extension of governmental 
activities and control over the private sector of society, and (3) they often call for drastic and very 
innovative action”. Therefore, political orientation should have no effect on policy support 
independent of environmental values and was excluded in analysis. Finally, the independent 
variables included in analysis were age, income, time used for traveling, time used for housework 
and environmental values.  
3.2.3 Dependent variables  
 In an effort to encapsulate some of the main goals of degrowth, I returned to Cosme et al.’s 
(2017) analysis of degrowth proposals and chose 6 to act as dependent variables for this study. In 
Module 3, participants were asked whether they would support the implementation of such a 
policy. The 6 policy proposals are to:  
(1) limit trade distances and volume;  
(2) create a moratorium on new infrastructure (e.g. nuclear plants, highways, dams);  
(3) tax resource use;  
(4) implement redistributive taxation schemes (I referred to this proposal as progressive 
      taxation);  
(5) create a basic/citizen’s income; and  
(6) reduce working hours.  
Cosme et al. (2017) found that the majority of degrowth proposals published in academic literature 
are focused at the national level and follow a top-down approach, therefore each proposal I selected 






I included this proposal because I was interested in seeing whether respondents would be reluctant 
to give up some of the goods they consume from elsewhere in the world.  
 As part of the survey questionnaire, participants were asked whether or not they would 
support the implementation of a policy. For 4 out of the 6 policies, each of the participants who 
said they would not support it was prompted with a follow-up question that included a statement 
intended to facilitate a social rationality within the participant’s logic. The follow-up statements I 
wrote shared facts about the implications each policy has on other beings (human or non-human) 
and on the natural environment. This was done to encourage participants to reflect on the effects 
of their decision-making. They were then asked again whether they support the policy, bearing in 
mind what they had just read. These statements are summarized in Table 3.2. As put forth by 
Etzioni (1988), surveys are not the best way to elicit a social rationality due to the isolation of 
respondents and the sole requirement of thinking as an individual. A more fitting approach to of 
capturing social rationality is the use of focus groups, allowing participants to deliberate issues as 
a collective. If participants still did not support the policy, they were asked why not.  
In Module 4, respondents were asked whether they had heard of degrowth and understood 
what it entails. If respondents answered yes, they were asked whether they would support a 
degrowth transition in Canada. If respondents answered no, they were given a commonly used 
definition of degrowth (see Appendix A), and then asked whether they would support the 
transition. Each of these binary variables were used as the response variables in the regression 
analysis detailed below. Lastly, if participants did not support the policy proposal or a degrowth 
transition in Canada, they were prompted with an open-ended question, asking them why they did 







Table 3.2 Social rationality statements included in follow up questions for policy support  




In September 2019, Canada imported $50 billion and exported $50 billion worth of 
goods and services. Some of the major results of the international trade we support 
through our consumption habits include greenhouse gas emissions from increased 
economic activity and transportation, pollution, degrading natural resources, etc. 
Create a 
moratorium on new 
infrastructure  
Some of the major results of oil sands projects and pipelines include violation of 
Indigenous rights, greenhouse gas emissions, waste management issues, pipeline 
leaks and ruptures, decreased air quality, risks to wildlife, population displacement, 
water contamination, etc. 
Tax resource use Some of the major results of our energy consumption include climate change due to 
greenhouse gas emissions, air pollution, forest destruction, ecosystem degradation, 
unequal access to energy, health impacts from air pollution, population 
displacement, dam failures, etc.  
Create a basic 
income  
While a universal basic income would lead some people to earn less money, it would 
also alleviate those in poverty by ensuring that everyone’s basic human needs (i.e. 
supply of clean water, food, housing) are met. 
3.3 Data analysis 
3.3.1 Dataset 
 The dataset was exported from Dynata in the form of a raw Excel file, and imported into 
RStudio software to carry out data analysis. Dynata was responsible for performing data quality 
checks, whereby surveys from respondents who answered too quickly (“speeders”), and surveys 
with nonsensical feedback on open-ended questions were removed and replaced. Each survey was 
given a unique code by Dynata, and I numerically coded the responses to allow for statistical 










Table 3.3 Numerical coding for the different modules of the survey  
 
Independent variables  
Module 1  
Sociodemographics  
Income:  Under $29,999 = 1; $30,000 to $59,999 = 2; $60,000 to $89,999 = 3; $90,000 
to $119,999 = 4; $120,000 to 149,999 = 6; Over $150,000 = 7 
 
Education: High school diploma = 1; Some CEGEP or university = 2; CEGEP or 
technical school certificate = 3; Undergraduate degree = 4; Graduate degree = 5 
 
Employment status: Not working = 1; Working part-time = 2; Working full-time = 3 
 
Political orientation: Far-left = 1; Center-left = 2; Center = 3; Center-right = 4; Far-




Not at all concerned = 1; Somewhat unconcerned = 2; Neutral = 3; Somewhat 
concerned = 4; Extremely concerned = 5 
 
Strongly disagree = 1; Disagree = 2; Neutral = 3; Agree = 4; Strongly agree = 5 
 
Dependent variables  
Module 3 
Support for policy 
proposals 
Yes = 1; No = 0  
Module 4 
Support for degrowth  
Yes = 1; No = 0  
 
During analysis, the ordinal variables were treated as continuous; a recommendation 
discussed by Pasta (2009) and Williams (2019). In similar situations, the main concern that is 
usually expressed is the assumption that ordinal categories are equally spaced, or more precisely, 
that they have interval-level measurement with linear effects (Williams, 2019). In their analyses, 
Pasta established that the modelling results are “remarkably insensitive to the spacing of an ordinal 
variable except in the most extreme cases” and Williams confirmed that “it will often be ok to treat 
an ordinal variable as though it had linear effects”.  
3.3.2 Statistical analysis  
Using the RStudio software, I carried out descriptive statistics, correlational analyses, 






sociodemographic variables and environmental values on support for policy proposals, I 
performed logistic regression, a mathematical modeling approach that can be used to describe the 
relationship of several independent variables to a dichotomous dependent variable (Kleinbaum & 
Klein, 2002). To compute this, I used the glm (generalized linear model) function in R. The 
structure of a GLM includes a response variable y and k predictors, and we use this to understand 
how the mean of y varies as the values of the predictors change (Fox & Weisberg, 2011). Explained 
by Fox and Weisberg, a GLM consists of three components: 
1.  A random component, which specifies the conditional distribution of the response variable 
given the predictors. For my models, the binomial distribution was used, as the response 
variables (support for policy proposals) had binomial response options (yes/no).  
2.   The predictors in a GLM are translated into a set of k regressor variables, x = (𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑘). 
In a GLM, the response depends on the predictors only through a linear function of the 
regressors, called the linear predictor,  
𝜂(x) =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑥1  + ∙ ∙ ∙  + 𝛽𝑘 𝑥𝑘 
3. The link function translates from the scale of the mean response to the scale of the linear 

















where log𝑒  [
?̂? (x)
1−?̂? (x)
]  denotes the expected value of the predictor variable y (whether or not 
respondents support the policy proposal), βk denotes the parameters, and xk denotes the explanatory 
variables (socio-demographics and environmental values).  
While there is no agreed upon index of goodness of fit in logistic regression, several exist 
and are referred to as pseudo-R2 s, as analogs of R2 used in ordinary least-squares regression 
(Cohen et al., 2003). R2 denotes the coefficient of determination, the proportion of the total sample 
variability around y that is explained by the predictors (Cohen et al., 2003). To calculate the 
coefficient of determination for each of my models, I used McFadden’s (1974) pseudo-R2, 
𝑅𝑀𝐹
2 = 1 −
𝐿𝐿(𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙)
𝐿𝐿(𝑁𝑢𝑙𝑙)
                                                    (3.4) 
where LL(Full) denotes the full-model log-likelihood (or the residual deviance) and LL(Null) 
denotes the intercept-only log-likelihood (or the null deviance) (Smith & McKenna, 2013). 
To test whether the inclusion of social rationality had a statistically significant effect on 
the responses of support for policy proposals, I employed the Chi-squared Test of Independence, 
whereby two random variables x (support for the policy proposal before the inclusion of social 
rationality) and y (support for the policy proposal after) are called independent if the probability 
distribution of one variable is not affected by the presence of another (Yau, 2020). Yau explains 
the equation written as 
                                       𝒳2 = ∑  
(𝑓𝑖𝑗− 𝑒𝑖𝑗)² 
𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝑖,𝑗                                                 (3.2)                  
 
where fij denotes the observed frequencies belonging to both i-th category of x and j-th category 






3.3.3 Hypotheses  
3.3.3.1 Valuation of the environment and the economy  
To inform the research topic of public opinions on degrowth in Montréal, there are several 
secondary questions I would like to answer. Acknowledging that I am the first researcher to address 
this topic in Montréal, I can only draw on literature from elsewhere in the world which itself is 
very limited. My first research objective is to assess how respondents weigh the environment 
versus the economy, an objective that is informed by Drews et al. (2018), who found that in most 
countries, people prioritize environmental protection over the economy, as well as Drews and van 
den Bergh (2016) and Tomaselli et al. (2019), who similarly looked at this topic found that the 
majority of respondents were against growth at all costs. Tomaselli et al. (2019) specifically 
researched Canadian public opinion and found their respondents to hold strong environmental 
values. I therefore hypothesize:  
H1: Respondents weigh the environment over the economy.  
3.3.3.2 General support for degrowth policy proposals  
Considering the above, I return to the debate about well-being and degrowth in Büchs & 
Koch’s 2019 article, where they argue that the high levels of objective and subjective well-being 
that Western countries enjoy need to be maintained if degrowth is to gain support. As mentioned, 
the authors discuss the limited support for wealth and income caps and maintain that these 
proposals would be met with strong opposition from the wealthy. On the other hand, the concerns 
for unemployment, inequality and social conflict for the rapid societal change that degrowth would 
bring would likely lead to opposition from the poor. However, because Montréal is a part of 






2019), I speculate the majority of respondents will be more concerned with their wellbeing. While 
some may value the environment over the economy and support the idea of protecting the 
environment, it has been found that some people are unwilling to make material sacrifices in order 
to protect the environment (Ančić & Domaze, 2015). I therefore hypothesize:  
H2: Respondents will have mixed support for degrowth policy proposals.  
3.3.3.3 Effect of social rationality  
Recalling the role of social collectivities in decision-making and the I&We paradigm 
discussed by Etzioni (1988), the insertion of the social rationality statements above was an attempt 
to facilitate a social rationality instead of an individualistic one within respondents when 
considering policy support. By doing this through follow up questions for respondents who do not 
support degrowth policies, I hypothesize: 
H3: Respondents successfully reflecting through a social rationality shift their 
decision from not supporting the degrowth policy proposal to supporting it.   
3.3.3.4 Determinants of opinions on degrowth policy proposals 
3.3.3.4.1 Age 
In order to assess potential statistical relationships between socio-demographics and 
support for degrowth policies, the following variables were included in the regression analysis and 
hypothesized to have an effect. Many researchers have found that environmental values to decline 
with age (e.g. Franzen & Meyer, 2010; Hawcroft & Milfont, 2010), potentially because of recent 
increases in environmental education, changing norms in concern for the environment (Whitmarsh, 
2011). This shows that age should have a negative effect on policy support through environmental 






social order, which is sometimes seen as threatened by environmental policies that require 
changing values and behavior, therefore it is logical for younger people to support environmental 
reform (Van Liere & Dunlap, 1980). This would mean age should have a negative effect on policy 
support, independent of environmental values. Other researchers have found age to either have a 
positive effect or mixed effects (e.g. Franzen & Vogl, 2013; Shen & Saijo, 2008; Wiernik et al., 
2013, Xu & Li, 2018). One reason for this could be that younger people have been found to have 
more faith in technological advancement as the answer to environmental issues, and therefore feel 
no urgency to change (Benn, 2004). As the future of young people seems increasingly bleak, I 
hypothesize:  
H4: Age has a negative effect on degrowth policy support.  
3.3.3.4.2 Income  
Income has been shown to have a positive effect on environmental values (e.g. Franzen & 
Meyer, 2010; Franzen & Vogl 2013; Shen & Saijo, 2008; Tomaselli et al., 2019), suggesting they 
are not independent of each other. One possible reason for this is discussed by Van Liere an Dunlap 
(1980), which draws on Maslow's (1970) hierarchy of needs, whereby upper and middle classes 
are able to achieve their basic needs and are therefore free to put their energy toward other issues, 
like concerning themselves with the state of the environment. Another interesting argument is 
made by Morrison et al. (1972) and discussed by Van Liere an Dunlap (1980) who state “the 
middle and upper classes are more likely to have experienced pleasant residential, work, and 
recreational environments, and consequently are more concerned about the deterioration of the 
physical environment”. Effects of income on concern for the environment have also been mixed, 
negative or non-significant (Dunlap et al., 2000; Ejelöv & Nilsson, 2020, Xu & Li, 2018). One of 






poor environmental conditions, be it living and/or working in highly polluted areas, having access 
to poor recreational facilities (Buttel & Flinn, 1978), or suffering disproportionately from the 
adverse effects of climate change (Islam & Winkel, 2017), they are expected to be concerned with 
the environment. Moreover, when speaking on the environmentalism of the poor, Martinez-Alier 
(2014) states that “in the many resource extraction and waste disposal conflicts in history and 
today, the poor are often on the side of the preservation of nature against business firms and the 
state”. The author adds that people will act when the environment is a source of livelihood, and 
wealthier people have in general lost their sense of the environment as such.  
When hypothesizing the effect of income on each degrowth policy proposal included in 
this study, there are reasons to suspect the effect to be different for different policies. When 
considering a policy that would limit trade, individuals with higher incomes may not be affected 
by an increase prices of imported goods simply because they can afford it. However, Wall and 
Heslop (1986) found that Canadians with higher incomes were most negative about Canadian-
made products versus the quality of imports, and “consumers with higher incomes demand higher 
quality goods with higher prices” when considering imported goods (Bekkers et al., 2012). 
Therefore, those with higher incomes may be against limiting trade.  
When considering a policy that would implement a moratorium on new infrastructure (e.g. 
oil sand projects and affiliated pipelines, nuclear power plants, highways and dams), individuals 
with higher incomes, for example, could be financially invested in infrastructure projects (Cain, 
2018), or could realize that the moratorium would lead to a decrease in consumption (Schneider, 
2010), which they could be against. Lower income individuals could realize that the decrease in 






When considering a policy that would tax resource use, higher income individuals could 
react negatively because they have been found to consume more resources (e.g. Kalmykova et al., 
2016). Lower income individuals should react negatively because they simply cannot afford an 
increase in price.  
When considering a policy that would implement progressive taxation, or a redistribution 
of income from the rich to the poor, those with higher incomes should react negatively because it 
would mean a decrease in their income, while individuals with lower incomes should support the 
taxation because they would benefit financially (Hennighausen & Heinemann, 2014). In their 
study, Hennighausen and Heinemann (2014) found income to have a negative effect on support 
for progressive taxation.  
The effects of income on support for a basic income, should be similar for the proposal for 
progressive taxation, as it too would mean a distribution of income from rich to poor (Raventós, 
2007). It has already been found that income has a negative effect on support for a basic income 
(e.g. Parolin & Siöland, 2020). 
Lastly, when considering a policy that would reduce working hours, those with higher 
incomes have been found to prefer a reduction in workload, likely due to a more secure standard 
of living, while the opposite is true for those with lower incomes who likely cannot afford a 
decrease in income (Stier & Lewin-Epstein, 2003). However, those motivated by a desire for high 
incomes want more hours (Reynolds, 2004), therefore even those with high incomes could be 
against this policy.  
All this to say, income has an effect on policy support independent of its relationship with 






policies will more harshly impact those with higher incomes thereby theoretically negatively 
affecting their wellbeing, I hypothesize: 
H5: Income has a negative effect on degrowth policy support.  
3.3.3.4.3 Time used for travel/commuting 
A 2018 study by the Communauté métropolitaine de Montréal showed that two thirds of 
Greater Montréal residents still commute by car. While commute distance, transport resources, 
residential context and economic status are the main predictors of commuting by car, if the effects 
of these variables are controlled in analysis, attitudes and willingness to act to protect the 
environment were found to increase likelihood of switching from car-use (Clark et al., 2016). 
Another study found willingness to avoid cars to be negatively influenced by age and education 
(Tobler et al., 2012). The authors suggest this could be due to lower mobility of elderly people, 
and qualified jobs often requiring more traveling to meetings or commuting, respectively. 
Moreover, car use has been linked to time saving, comfort and convenience (Kent, 2015). With 
these factors in mind, the time used for commuting variable I included in the survey could affect 
policy support differently. For instance, participants who spend a lot of time commuting should, 
in theory, be against taxing resource use, as this would increase their cost of travel, while the same 
participants could be in favor of reducing work hours as it could lead to a reduction in travel time 
and therefore cost. Therefore, I can only hypothesize that:  
 H6: Hours spent commuting/travelling has a mixed effect on degrowth policy support. 
3.3.3.4.4 Time used for housework  
In Rochette’s (2016) gender-based analysis of climate policies in Canada and Québec, she 






majority doing the grocery shopping, food preparation and household chores such as laundry and 
cleaning, childrearing and caregiving for the elderly” (Institute de la Statistique du Québec, 2013). 
Other researchers around the world have also come to similar conclusions about gender as a 
determinant for who is doing the housework (e.g. Bianchi & Milkie, 2010; D’Alisa & Cattaneo, 
2013; Kuss & Neumarker, 2018; Sayer, 2005, 2016). Housework is considered unpaid work that 
generates a contribution to society and social well-being and is simultaneously placed in the 
‘leisure’ category in economic contexts, as it is not associated with income generation (Kuss & 
Neumarker, 2018). While reinterpreting the usual work-leisure dichotomy into two stages, one 
between paid and unpaid time and another between unpaid work and leisure, Kuss and Neumarker 
(2018) created a revised economic model of labour supply to explore how a basic income would 
affect the time allocated to these activities. While acknowledging that gender-based time use 
choices are highly influenced by social norms and cultural values (Anxo et al., 2011), the authors 
show that with the introduction of a basic income, people would be able to invest more of their 
time to unpaid activities, be it unpaid work or leisure. On that note, D’Alisa and Cattaneo 
importantly state that “this part of [unpaid] work remains outside the market, but it is necessary to 
structure and maintain households, human relationships and communities and providing 
sustenance and care”. Thus, the degrowth policy proposals I have included in this survey should, 
in theory, be affected by the amount of time one allocates to housework, because a degrowth 
transition would mean an increase in free time. However, when the policies are introduced 
separately, this variable may have a different effect on support, because time will be affected 
differently by each of them. More hours spent on housework should have a positive effect on 
support for basic income but may have a negative effect on support for limiting trade because 






because housework requires energy, for example. Those who spend more time on housework may 
be in favor of reducing work hours because it would mean more free time to spend on other 
necessary unpaid activities or leisure. With this in mind, I hypothesize:  
H7: Hours spent doing housework has a mixed effect on degrowth policy support.  
3.3.3.4.5 Environmental values 
 Environmental values have been found to have a positive effect on support for a degrowth 
oriented GDP growth rate (Drews & van den Bergh, 2016), and a positive effect on choosing the 
environment over the economy (Xu & Li, 2018), for example. Seeing as though degrowth 
embodies a quest for environmental (and social) sustainability, one can expect that:  
 H8: Environmental values have a positive effect on degrowth policy support.  
3.3.3.5 Support for a degrowth transition in Canada 
Lastly, respondents were asked whether they would support a degrowth transition in 
Canada, whether they already knew what degrowth was or they were supplied with a commonly 
used definition. To my knowledge, this has not yet been researched, therefore, based on the 
findings mentioned above, I hypothesize:   
H9: Respondents do not support the idea of a degrowth transition in Canada. 
3.3.3.6 Determinants of support for a degrowth transition in Canada 
 Based on the literature presented above, I expect the independent variables age, income, 
time used for traveling, time used for doing housework and environmental values, to have the same 






3.3.4 Qualitative analysis 
 Each respondent that did not support the implementation of a degrowth policy proposal or 
a degrowth transition in Canada, with or without the inclusion of the social rationality statements, 
was given the opportunity to provide qualitative answers in an open-ended question. If they did 
not support the policy or transition, they were simply asked “why not?”. These responses were 
then organized into categories I made, which I thought best summarized the feedback. An overview 
of the response categories is provided along with quotes in the section below and is explored in 
the Discussion and Conclusion section.  
 
3.4 Results  
3.4.1 Environmental values  
 Respondents appeared to hold strong environmental values by revealing a high degree of 
agreement on several themes (Table 3.4). Firstly, 81% of respondents reported that they are 
concerned about climate change (see item 1 in Table 3.4). Secondly, 86% agreed that a change in 
basic attitudes and values is necessary in order to solve environmental problems and 81% agreed 
that humans are presently interfering too much with the natural environment (see items 2 and 5 in 
Table 3.4), indicating the belief that change is needed to adequately address environmental issues. 
Third, only 32% agreed that technology can overcome any environmental problems, while 32% 
were neutral and 37% disagreed with the statement (see item 3 in Table 3.4), indicating mixed 
feelings but a general lack of faith in technology. Fourth, the majority of respondents (78%) agreed 
that natural resources should be used primarily to provide for basic needs rather than material 






should be given to protecting the environment, even if it hurts the economy (see item 6 in Table 
3.4). These findings support the hypothesis that respondents weigh the environment over the 
economy.  
 
3.4.2 Support for degrowth policy proposals  
The majority of respondents said they would support the implementation of degrowth 
policy proposals, with one exception of one policy (Table 3.5). Despite the large majority of 
respondents reporting strong environmental values, support for specific policies was considerably 
weaker. First, 209 respondents (54%) said they would support a policy that would limit trade 
distances and volume. Second, 242 (63%) said they would support a moratorium on new 
Table 3.4 Descriptive statistics for attitudinal statements 






Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
  
1. How concerned are you about 
climate change?ª 
21.8 3.4 14.0 43.1 37.7 4.11 0.89 
2. A change in basic attitudes and 
values is necessary in order to solve 
environmental problems. 
0.8 1.6 11.9 42.9 42.9 4.25 0.78 
3. Technology can overcome any 
environmental problems. 
7.5 29.1 31.9 24.2 7.3 2.94 1.06 
4. Natural resources should be used 
primarily to provide for basic needs 
rather than material wealth. 
1.0 5.7 21.6 43.6 28.1 3.91 0.9 
5. Humans are presently interfering 
too much with the natural 
environment. 
0.3 5.7 13.2 42.3 38.4 4.12 0.86 
6. The highest priority should be 
given to protecting the environment, 
even if it hurts the economy. 
2.3 9.1 24.9 40.5 23.1 3.72 0.99 
ª Scale coding for Item 1: Not at all concerned = 1, Somewhat unconcerned = 2, Neutral = 3, Somewhat 








infrastructure. Third, 146 (38%) said they would support the implementation of a tax on resource 
use. Fourth, 204 (53%) said they would support progressive taxation. Fifth, 242 (63%) said they 
would support a basic income. Lastly, 289 (75%) said they would support a reduction of work 
hours. These distributions can be visualized in Figure 3.3. These findings support hypothesis 2, 
that respondents have mixed support for degrowth policy proposals. 
 
 














Table 3.5 Summary of respondent support for degrowth policy proposals 
 
 Rª F % Rb F % Valid % 













































































































N/A N/A N/A N/A 










































N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Notes: R = Response. F = Frequency. “Valid” signifies the active participants in a particular question. 
ª Base question (i.e. would you support the implantation of x policy) 
b Follow-up question for those who answered ‘No’ to Rª (brings in social rationality and asks again) 
 
3.4.3 Effects of social rationality  
 The effects of social rationality on respondent support for degrowth policy proposals are 
summarized in the Rb column of Table 3.5 and can be visualized in Figure 3.4. Of the 176 
respondents who initially said they would not support a policy that limited trade distances and 






rationality statement, marking a 15pp increase in total support for the policy. Of the 143 
respondents who said they would not support a policy that would create a moratorium on new 
infrastructure, 47 respondents changed their answer, marking a 12pp increase in total support for 
the policy.  Of the 239 respondents who said they would not support the implementation of a tax 
on resource use, 52 respondents changed their answer, increasing the total support for the policy 
by 13pp. Of the 143 respondents who said they would not support the implementation of a basic 
income, 28 respondents changed their answer, shifting the total support for the policy by 7pp. 
Interestingly, the shift for basic income is notably smaller than the shift for other policies. I suspect 
this is because basic income is the only policy of the 4 that would directly impact respondents’ 
income.  
 
Figure 3.4 Percentages of policy support, with those who initially did not support the policy but changed their mind after reading the social 
rationality statements shown in yellow 
 
 I performed the Chi-squared Test of Independence to see if the shift in responses from 
before and after the incorporation of the social rationality statements was statistically significant. 
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and taxing resource use, are significant at the 1% level and significant at the 5% level for the basic 
income policy proposal.  
   Table 3.6 Chi-squared testing results for the effect of incorporating  
    social rationality statements 
 
X2 
Limit trade distances and volume 16.60*** 
Create a moratorium on new infrastructure 12.83*** 
Tax resource use  12.63*** 
Create a basic income  4.249** 
   Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.  
These findings support hypothesis 3, that after reading the social rationality statements, some 
respondents shift their decision from not supporting the degrowth policy proposal to supporting it. 
It is important to note that the social rationality statements could have been written differently, and 
thus have the potential to have even stronger effects. This could be an important finding for policy 
makers and politicians, as some individuals can be swayed to change their opinions on certain 
policy proposals when asked to reflect through a social rationality than an individual one.  
3.4.4 Determinants of degrowth policy support  
To assess the relationships between the independent and dependent variables, I conducted 
several logistic regression analyses in order to understand which individual characteristics might 
explain degrowth policy support (Table 3.7). The 6 models include the same set of independent 
variables. Each model was tested for multicollinearity using the variance inflation factor function 
in R and no multicollinearity was detected.  
Each model indicates that respondents who are older are less likely to support the policy. 
With the exception of that for infrastructure moratoria, this effect is statistically significant; the 






size. This finding therefore supports hypothesis 4, that age has a negative effect on degrowth policy 
support. Respondents who have a higher income are less likely to support progressive taxation, a 
basic income and the reduction of work hours, at a statistically significant level. It should be noted 
that the income variable was nearing significance for the moratorium on new infrastructure model, 
indicating that respondents with higher incomes were less likely to support the policy. The income 
variable was also nearing significance for the tax resource use model, showing that respondents 
with higher incomes were more likely to support the policy. These findings therefore do not 
support hypothesis 5, that income has a negative effect on degrowth policy support. Time used for 
traveling and doing housework were not significant predictors in any model, therefore providing 
no evidence to support hypotheses 6 and 7, that these variables have a mixed effect on degrowth 
policy support. Each of the models indicates that respondents with higher environmental values 
are more likely to support the policy proposal, at a highly statistically significant level, providing 
evidence to support hypothesis 8, that environmental values have a positive effect on degrowth 
policy support.  














work hours  
Age  - 0.0158* -0.0102 -0.0143* -0.0142* -0.0186** -0.0275*** 
Income 0.0329 -0.1140 0.1015 -0.1351** -0.2189*** -0.1322* 
Hours travelling 0.0110 0.0056 0.0027 -0.0000 0.0251 0.0179 
Hours housework -0.0220 0.0195 -0.0242 0.0030 0.0176 0.0137 
Environmental values 1.5582*** 2.0363*** 1.0193*** 0.6215*** 0.7777*** 0.5607*** 
Psuedo-R2 0.124 0.187 0.066 0.038 0.072 0.056 







 The pseudo-R2 values show that not a lot of variance is explained by the models above; 
the Limit trade model capturing 12.4% of variance, the Moratorium on new infrastructure model 
capturing 18.7%, the Tax resource use model capturing 6.6%, the Progressive taxation model 
capturing 3.8%, the Basic income model capturing 7.2%, and the Reduction of work hours model 
capturing 5.6%. According to Heeringa, West and Berglund (2017), studies involving human 
populations often find their best regression models to only explain 20%-40% of variance. The 
small sample size in this study is likely the cause for the low pseudo-R2 values, however they are 
consistent with values found in similar studies (e.g. Ančić & Domazet, 2015; Drews & van den 
Bergh, 2016; Xu & Li, 2018). 
3.4.5 Support for a degrowth transition in Canada 
Table 3.8 summarizes respondent support for a degrowth transition in Canada. Overall, the 
majority of respondents (65%) said they would support a transition to degrowth in Canada (see 
items 2 and 3 in Table 3.8). Of the 385 respondents, 108 (or 28%) had heard of degrowth and 
understand what it entails, while 277 (79%) had not. Of the 108 respondents who had heard of 
degrowth, 64 (59%) said they would support a 
degrowth transition in Canada, while 44 (41%) 
said they would not. Of the 277 who had not 
heard of degrowth, 184 (66%) said they would 
support a degrowth transition after being 
supplied a definition, while 93 (34%) said they 
would not. See Figure 3.5 for a visual 







Figure 3.5 Respondent support for a transition to degrowth in Canada  
(n = 108 & 277) 




          Table 3.8 Summary of respondent support for a degrowth transition in Canada 
 
 Response Frequency % Valid 
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3. Given a definition of 
degrowth and would 
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3.4.6 Determinants of support for a degrowth transition in Canada  
Next, I looked at the effects of the independent variables on support for a degrowth 
transition in Canada (Table 3.9). Each model was tested for multicollinearity using the variance 
inflation factor function in R and no multicollinearity was detected. 
Of the respondents who have already heard of and understand degrowth, those who spend 
more time travelling are more likely to support a degrowth transition in Canada. Of the respondents 
who had not heard of degrowth and were provided a definition, the model shows that those who 






income variable was nearing significance in the second model, indicating that those with higher 
incomes are also less likely to support a transition. Both models indicate that respondents who 
hold stronger environmental values are more likely to support a degrowth transition in Canada. 
 
Table 3.9 Logistic regression analyses of support for a degrowth transition in Canada 
 
 Had heard of & support 
degrowth 
Had not heard of degrowth; 
definition provided & support degrowth 
Age  -0.0039 -0.0290*** 
Income  -0.0847 -0.1368 
Hours travelling    0.0905* -0.0247 
Hours housework  0.0122 0.0251 
Environmental values  1.0566*** 0.9905*** 
Pseudo-R2  0.084 0.090 
Notes: *p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.  
 
3.4.7 Respondent reasoning for not supporting degrowth policy proposals 
Respondents who said they would not support the degrowth policy proposals discussed 
above were given an open-ended question asking why they would not support them. Based on 
these responses, I formulated general categories to summarize the findings. This section therefore 
introduces some of the main barriers to implementing degrowth policies.   
3.4.7.1 Limit trade distances and volume  
Of the 120 respondents (31.2% of all respondents) who did not support limiting trade 
distances and volume, the most frequently given reason for opposing the policy was about needing 
or wanting access to foreign products. For example, one person said: “Il y a des domaines 






domains that necessitate imported products. It seems as though there is fear behind this policy 
proposal, that international trade would be completely cut off, which would not be the case. Next, 
some respondents thought the policy would not do anything to help climate change/environmental 
issues. One person said: “I think there must be another more creative way to combat the issue. And 
Canada is not a major polluter on the world scale”. Gifford (2011) describes spatial discounting of 
environmental issues as a barrier to climate action, where “individuals believe that environmental 
conditions are worse in places other than their own”. It should be noted that Canada is ranked 11th 
in top emitting regions (Government of Canada, 2016). On the other hand, one person thought the 
policy could aid in reducing Canadian emissions, but it would not likely address environmental 
issues overall, stating “Cutting foreign trade might reduce our carbon emissions, but there is no 
promise it will reduce anyone else's”. This kind of mentality is very present in the literature, where 
perceived inequity is used as justification for nonaction (e.g. Gifford, 2011). Interestingly, one 
respondent stated:  
“La contribution du transport international aux GES ne me semble pas si importante par 
 rapport à la consommation d'énergie des ménages et entreprises, trafic routier, etc. Il faut 
 mettre l'accent sur un remplacement des technologies actuelles(utilisant GES) par des 
 technologies vertes(solaire, éolien, stockage, etc.) plutôt que la diminution des activités qui
 les utilisent.” 
Translated, this respondent believes that emissions from energy consumption in households and 
businesses, and road traffic are larger contributors to emissions, and that focus should be made on 
replacing current technologies with green technologies, as opposed to reducing the actual activity. 
This is consistent with green growth theory, which has been challenged by many as an effective 






2018). Another reason given for not supporting the policy was that limiting trade would hurt the 
economy; one person stated: “Very bad for economy even products manufactured in Canada need 
imported raw materials”. More generally, respondents repeatedly stated things like “the economy 
is essential (translated)”, “Economy impact, maintain competition”, “Fair trade is important”. One 
person said: “I think the world economy and world peace depends on strong trade relationships 
that benefit both parties equally”. Another said “Economy in my lifetime trumps over climate for 
the future generation”, all in all indicating that many are concerned with Canada maintaining 
economic integrity. A handful of respondents said they would be against the increase in product 
prices brought by limiting trade, indicating that income is a barrier to supporting this policy. 
Generally, the remaining respondents did not have a reason for opposing the policy, did not 
understand the question, or simply did not think it was necessary. 
3.4.7.2 Create a moratorium on new infrastructure   
Of the 96 (24.9%) respondents who said they would not support the implementation of a 
moratorium on new infrastructure, the most frequent response was, in one way or another, that we 
need fossil fuels and new infrastructure, and that we should exploit the resources we have in 
Canada. One person said “at the time being the world needs oil, until someone comes up with a 
better alternative”. One person thought that without exploiting our resources, we would succumb 
to an archaic way of life, stating “vaut mieux exploiter une richesse naturel que de respecter un 
mode de vie a[r]chaique”. Many people were also concerned that policy would have a negative 
impact on the economy and Canadian lives, with statements such as “can’t sacrifice economy” and 
“things that would improve the lives of Canadians should not be held back by politics”, indicating 
that some simply favor economic progress over environmental stability. A few respondents believe 






serve no purpose; “I am not sure about the benefits”; “no need”; and “would not solve the 
problem”, indicating that some respondents do not understand the social and environmental 
impacts that new infrastructure brings. Several respondents said they did not know why they were 
against the policy. 2 respondents believe that technology will have to be the solution, stating for 
example “because the world is getting more populated. It's up to technology to have us pollute 
less”. Several respondents did not understand the question, for example stating things like “it is 
destroying wildlife”; “it is not environmentally friendly”; and “Because it destroys environment 
and kills all types of animals”. Many responses were put into an ‘other’ category, mainly including 
nonsensical answers, those with no interest or no comment, and a select few with interesting 
responses that could not be put into the above categories. One example is “La terre est foutue, nous 
ne pouvons rien y faire”, meaning the Earth is done for and there is nothing we can do, indicating 
the belief that it will be impossible to reverse anthropogenic impacts on the planet. One person 
said “The Indiginous peoples were already paid billions in the past so enough is enough”, referring 
to my social rationality statement explaining that oil sands and pipelines often violate Indigenous 
rights. It is interesting that this was the one factor that deterred the respondent from supporting the 
policy, perhaps because the respondent simply does not care about the impacts new infrastructure 
has on others.  
3.4.7.3 Tax resource use 
Of the 189 (49.1%) respondents who said they would not support the implementation of a 
tax on resource use, the majority said it was due to financial reasons like they are already taxed 
heavily in Québec and Canada and pay too much, for example, stating “in Quebec we already pay 
a lot of taxes, income tax and sales tax is the highest in Canada. They should be taxing the 






affected by this tax”. Additionally, many said they would not be able to afford the increase. One 
person simply said “I am not a rich person”, and another said “I feel like we are already being 
taxed plenty and adding such other taxes would create a lot of unrest amongst the lower and middle 
economic classes”. Several respondents said that the government or large energy companies should 
be the ones to pay for example, one person saying “Governments should provide and implement 
changes at their cost. Not on the citizens”, and another saying “It is not to us to pay in taxes. Those 
taxes should come from those who don't pay enough taxes like the banks and the big companies”. 
Several respondents also thought the policy was unnecessary or not a solution, by simply stating 
“I don't think it's necessary” or “Taxing stuff is too simplistic a solution”. Some thought that 
because hydroelectricity is a primary energy source in Québec, there should not be a tax. For 
example: “Being from Quebec our electricity comes from renewable hydro and wind sources these 
two do not overly contribute to greenhouse gases in their use” and “Where I live electricity is a 
renewable source by water and therefore very environmentally friendly compared to nuclear plants 
or gas”. A few respondents said resource use is a necessity; stating things like “It’s part of life and 
would add to household expenses”, “these provide basic survival, and the poor already can't afford 
it”, and “Pourquoi ajouter des taxes a des source essential”, meaning why add taxes to essential 
resources. A handful believed the tax money would not be used properly by the government, by 
writing “I don't believe this is a solution but more money grab by the government” and 
“government wastes enough of our money. It would not go towards the stated goals”. Others did 
not understand the question, did not have any reasoning, thought it would be too complicated, and 






3.4.7.4 Progressive taxation 
Of the 181 (47.0%) respondents who said they would not support the implementation of 
progressive taxation, the most frequent response was that people earn their money and it should 
not be taken away and high wages create competition and motivation. For example, one respondent 
wrote “C’est injuste pour ceux qui travaillent plus que d’autres / qui ont fait de plus longues student 
et donc méritent un salaire plus élevé”, meaning it is unfair for those who work harder than others 
and who went to school, as they deserve higher incomes. The second most frequent answer was 
that they are already taxed enough. Several said the money would not be used properly by the 
government, by saying things like “Because it would never go where it should” and “Don’t trust 
elected representatives. Enough corruption is already around”. Several said that this resembled 
communism and they did not want that. One response read “parce que je ne veux pas me retrouver 
dans une forme de gouvernement socialiste voire communiste”, meaning the respondent did not 
want to be under a socialist or communist government. Several said that people would leave and 
go somewhere they are not taxed, for example: “goodbye to people trying to better themselves by 
working hard and trying to succeed in life. Socialism would destroy our wonderful country”. 
Several simply thought that 100% taxation was too much. A few thought it was unrealistic or it 
would be too difficult to put in place. Many did not understand the question and/or the concept 
and wanted more information, for example: “I would need more information, this sounds strange. 
While on paper it sounds ok, in reality not so much”, and many simply did not like the idea.  
3.4.7.5 Basic income 
Of the 115 (29.9%) respondents who said they would not support the implementation of a 
basic income, the most frequent response was revolving around ideas that people who work harder 






encourage laziness. Examples include “[Education] and hard work are to pay off and not support 
the lazy”; “A chacun son argent”, meaning to each his own money; and “Chacun doit travailler 
rien de gratuit dans la vie”, meaning everyone has to work in life because nothing is free. Many 
said this resembled communism or Marxism and they were against that, that it would not be 
possible to implement, that inequality has and will always exist, or that people would abuse the 
system. A few said there is already help in place for the poor, or that the government should be 
responsible, for example: “let social welfare and other government programs take care of poverty. 
That's what our taxes are for”. Several respondents provided nonsensical answers, did not 
understand the question and/or concept, or were simply against the idea.  
3.4.7.6 Reduce work hours  
Of the 96 (24.9%) respondents who said they would not support the implementation of a 
policy that would reduce work hours, the most frequent response was that they could not afford a 
decrease in income or that they wanted to work more to earn more. One person said “Evidemment 
j'aime l'idée de travailler moins mais pas de réduire mon salaire”, meaning they like the idea of 
working less but not reducing their income. Someone else similarly said “More leisure time does 
not benefit me if I am making less money. Several respondents thought it would destabilize the 
economy; one saying “L'econnomie ne peut pas avancer si les personnes ne travaillent pas”, 
meaning the economy cannot move forward if people are not working, and another saying “The 
country would not benefit from less hours”. Several said that people should be able to choose 
whether or not to work less, for example: “I believe people should be able to choose the amount 
of hours they wish to work, especially if they are paid by the hour”. Several respondents thought 
that a 5-day work week is normal, and that people are fully capable of doing this, one person 






space for rest on the weekends of two days”. Others thought the policy proposal was not realistic, 
had no interest in it, no reason for opposing it, or did not understand the purpose and/or concept.  
3.4.7.7 Summary 
The most common reasons given by respondents for opposing these degrowth policy 
proposals was that some of these policies would have negative impacts on the economy, would 
negatively affect their personal economic situations (i.e. income, economic stability), would be 
unfair, or would not solve social and environmental issues. Less commonly used responses 
included distrust in the government, anti-communistic ideals, that the government should be 
responsible for handling and paying for the issues associated with the policies, and that the policies 
are unrealistic and would be very hard to implement. More specific to Québec, many respondents 
were opposed to some of these policies because of the current high tax rate in the province and 
because the primary energy source in the province is hydroelectricity, a “renewable” resource that 
can be sustainably used. These responses to the open-ended questions provide important insight as 
to the barriers to garnering support for degrowth policies in Canada. These results can be used by 
degrowth advocates to tailor communications strategies specifically to help assuage people's 
concerns about the potential negative impacts of degrowth economies for example. 
 
3.4.8 Respondent reasoning for not supporting a degrowth transition in Canada 
 Respondents were given an open-ended question asking why they would not support the 
implementation of a degrowth transition in Canada. Of the 44 respondents (11.4% of total) who 
had heard of and understand degrowth and said they would not support a transition, the most 






quality of life or that economic growth is a good thing. One person said “Parce que c'est pas 
favorable à l'économie du pays”, meaning it would not be favorable for the country’s economy. 
Several respondents were simply against it, saying it was unnecessary or they were not interested. 
Others said they did not know why they would not support the transition, they thought it was 
utopic, they were against socialism, or admitted they did not fully understand what degrowth was. 
 Of the 93 respondents (24.2% of total) who were supplied a definition of degrowth and 
said they would not support a transition; the most frequent response was without explanation and 
that they were simply against it. The next most frequent answer was centered how it would hurt 
the economy, that economic growth is necessary and good, that it would lower the quality of life 
and that they were against government control/communism. Responses included, “Because I do 
not think that we need to sacrifice our economic system to protect the environment”; “would kill 
the economy”; “Because my parents lived through communism and this definition resembles it. I 
believe that people should be allowed to reach individual potentials without governmental 
restrictions”; and “I think that sounds anti-capitalist and capitalism has done well for us in creating 
prosperity”. Many said it is too complicated and it would be impossible to implement, saying 
things like “wishful thinking”; “won’t work”; “nice in theory, but hardly applicable”; and “parce 
que c'est trop de changement. c'est vraiment utopique et ca fait joli sur le papier mais n'est pas 
réalisable dans la vrai vie”, meaning it would be too much of a change, that it is very utopic, and 
that it is nice on paper but not applicable in real life. Several respondents did not understand the 
concept and/or definition, shown through responses like: “complicated to understand”; “Sorry, but 
I didn't really understand your definition - it's too lengthy for me to comprehend”; “I do not really 
understand the principle and I do not think that the population is ready to make these changes at 






faudrait que j'en sache plus à ce sujet, mais je n'ai pas entendu parler de ça”, meaning they did not 
understand the implications of degrowth by reading the definition, that they would need to know 
more on the subject, and that they had never heard of it before. Several respondents simply said 
they were unsure why they would not support the transition.  
To summarize, in both groups, many people were concerned about the negative 
implications degrowth would have on the economy, many thought a degrowth transition is 
unrealistic and not applicable, many were simply against the idea, not providing more detail, and 
several respondents did not fully understand what the transition would entail.  
 
3.5 Discussion and conclusion 
This study is aimed at capturing an overview of people’s support for degrowth policy 
proposals and support for a degrowth transition. Support for degrowth could be seen as an 
environmental value in itself, as degrowth is by definition, a pursuit of sustainability (both social 
and environmental). By asking respondents about their environmental values prior to their support 
for degrowth, I was able to capture a sense of their pre-existing attitudes. As expected, respondents 
displayed strong environmental values as summarized in Table 3.5. This finding is in line with the 
study by Tomaselli et al. (2019) with similar results, finding Canadians to hold strong 
environmental values. As mentioned, some research has shown that people are unlikely to make 
personal material sacrifice in order to protect the environment, and that pro-environmental 
behavior is focused more on low-impact actions for reducing emissions (Ančić & Domazet, 2015). 
This could be the reason for the mixed support for degrowth policy proposals: after the inclusion 
of the social rationality statements, the majority of respondents support limiting trade distances 






(70%), and reducing work hours (75%), while support for taxing resource use (51%) and 
implementing a progressive taxation system (53%) is lower.  
As there are no studies looking at public opinions on policies that would limit trade, I can 
only discuss the reasoning behind not supporting the policy given by respondents in this study. If 
a policy was put in place that would limit trade distances and volume, people would lose access to 
certain products or the prices of those products would increase. People are accustomed to having 
relatively easy access to the things they want and the idea of losing this privilege deterred some 
respondents from supporting the policy. Other reasons for not supporting the policy included the 
opinion that it would not solve environmental issues or that it would hurt the economy. This could 
be because of the way I explained the possible implications of the policy in the questionnaire, in 
that it did not clearly outline the positive effects it would have on the environment. Interestingly, 
of those who responded with concern for the economy, they reported being more in agreeance with 
prioritizing the environment over the economy in the environmental values module (mean value 
of 3.8 where 5 = strongly agree). This could indicate that people are more willing to live sustainable 
lifestyles in theory than in practice. Concern for negative impacts on the economy indicates that 
some respondents simply care more for the integrity of the province’s/country’s economy than for 
the environment, signifying a noteworthy barrier for the advancement of degrowth. Aside from 
these reasons, 54% said they would support the policy, indicating that they likely understand the 
environmental and economic implications that would come from continuing to trade as usual. 
There is also no existing public opinion literature on the policy proposal of banning new 
infrastructure. A moratorium on new infrastructure like oil sand projects and affiliated pipelines 
would only slightly impact people’s lifestyles in that there would be less of that resource at some 






most likely weighed the benefits for the environment over the minor impacts the policy would 
have on their lives. The rest of the sample generally believes that fossil fuels and new infrastructure 
are completely necessary, that the policy would have a negative impact on the economy, or that it 
would not solve environmental issues. The opinion that new infrastructure is necessary could 
indicate the idea that fossil fuels are not harmful, or that there are no possible alternatives. Again, 
there are some who are simply more concerned with the economy than the environment. However, 
respondents concerned with the effects of this policy on the economy similarly said they prioritized 
the environment over the economy in Module 1 (average 3.7 where 5 = strongly agree). This shows 
a disparity between self-reported environmental values and policy support.  
Support for creating a basic income was quite high, at 70% approval, likely demonstrating 
high concerns for justice, poverty and inequality as discussed by Raventós (2007). This high 
degree of support could also indicate that respondents do not fully understand the implications of 
a basic income. The respondents who did not support the policy proposal were mainly concerned 
with fairness, arguing that people should be able to keep the money they earn; laziness and lack of 
motivation in others; and the policy’s resemblance to communism. Apprehensions about a 
declining work ethic and deservingness of the income have been previously found (e.g. Roosma 
& Van Oorschot, 2020; Van Oorschot, 1998), however the point of a basic income is to benefit all 
individuals, even those “undeserving”. With more research, a basic income could prove to be a 
favorable policy in Montréal, Québec, or even Canada.  
The proposal for a reduction of work hours was highly supported, with 75% of respondents 
saying they would back the policy. These respondents are likely in comfortable economic 
situations, being able to afford a decrease in income in favor of more free time, and/or could have 






against the policy were reportedly unable to afford a decrease in income, were concerned that it 
would have negative impacts on the economy or were content with their current workload and 
weekly work hours. The inability to afford a decrease in income from working time reduction was 
also found by Stier and Lewin-Epstein (2003). Several said that people should be given the option 
to reduce their workload, rather than it being mandatory. With the majority of respondents saying 
they would support a reduction in work hours, it would likely be a favorable policy to introduce in 
Montréal, even more so if it were optional.  
As for taxing resource use, only 51% of respondents supported this policy proposal. The 
portion in favor of the policy likely understand the implications of resource use on the 
environment. The portion against the policy, however, can largely be explained by its geographical 
context. Québec residents pay comparatively higher taxes (income, consumption) than the other 
provinces in Canada (Government of Canada, 2020; Revenu Québec, 2020). While both the 
province and country are taxed at lower rates than other (mostly European) countries (OECD, 
2019), inter-provincial comparison is presumably where Québec residents foster their frustration 
with tax rates. Accordingly, of the 49% of respondents who were against this policy, a large portion 
said this was due to financial reasons, such as being heavily taxed in Québec and not being able to 
afford another tax. Additionally, as Québec’s electricity is mostly generated using (“renewable”) 
hydroelectricity (Canada Energy Regulator, 2020), several respondents felt there was no need to 
be concerned with the province’s energy use. Other respondents said governments or large 
corporations should be the ones to take a financial hit, arguing that they do not pay enough taxes. 
This is reflective of Bernauer and McGrath’s (2016) finding that many prefer to be uninvolved 
actors in climate policy and rather be disengaged in mitigating emissions. Some respondents said 






the government, an issue that has similarly been found amongst Canadians by the Angus Reid 
Institute (2019). Taxing resource use does not seem to be a favorable place to start for politicians 
in Montréal or Québec.  
Progressive taxation was also not popular among respondents, with only 53% favoring the 
policy. Similar to those who supported the implementation of a basic income, it could be that this 
portion of respondents had concerns for justice, poverty and inequality. The definition of 
progressive taxation given to respondents did not include the environmental implications of higher 
incomes, therefore it is unlikely that many respondents made the association. Of the respondents 
who were against the policy, the main reasons had to do with fairness, whereby people should get 
to keep the money they earn; already being taxed heavily; distrust in the government; and the 
policy being too communistic/socialistic. Hennighausen and Heinemann (2014) similarly found 
that support was based on fairness perceptions and beliefs in the role of effort for economic 
success. This speaks to the role of framing progressive taxation in an equitable way. Several 
respondents were against the policy because they thought a 100% tax was too much. This response 
is likely due to the wording and framing of the definition of progressive taxation. Had it been 
written differently, it may have not deterred the respondents who gave this answer – as previously 
mentioned, Reimers (2009) found that support for progressive taxation was affected by the way 
the scenario was framed. I suspect the responses to this question were highly affected by the way 
it was written, and therefore may not truly reflect opinions.  
Support for each policy except the moratorium on new infrastructure is likely to be higher 
among younger individuals. The lack of statistical significance here is likely due to the small 
sample size. These findings were expected, as younger people are more likely to support 






Dunlap, 1980). Support for progressive taxation, basic income and a reduction of work hours is 
likely to be higher among individuals with lower incomes. Again, noting that the income variables 
were nearing significance for the moratorium and tax resource use models, the lack of significance 
is again likely due to the sample size. In regard to the significant findings, the negative effect of 
income was expected, as degrowth policies would impact individuals with higher incomes more 
harshly. For progressive taxation and basic income, those with higher incomes were likely against 
the policies because they would lead to a decrease in income. Buch-Hansen and Koch (2019) 
suggest it may be because the proposals are not fully defined yet and therefore are hard to envision 
and implement. The negative effect of income on supporting progressive taxation (Hennighausen 
& Heinemann, 2014) and basic income (Parolin & Siöland, 2020) has already been found. As for 
a reduction of working hours, it is likely that individuals with higher incomes are against this 
policy because they are accustomed to their lifestyle and are motivated by the desire for higher 
incomes brought by working more (Reynolds, 2004).  
Surprisingly, time spent traveling and time spent doing housework were not significant 
variables in any model. Notably, these variables have not been used in other studies, therefore I 
can only speculate as to why they had no effect. I expected mixed effects from both variables on 
policy support. Two thirds portion of Greater Montréal residents still commute by car 
(Communauté Métropolitaine de Montréal, 2018), likely due to time saving, comfort and 
convenience (Kent, 2015). Those traveling a lot would be negatively impacted by a ban on new 
infrastructure and a tax on resource use, evidently leaving to an increase in prices on petrol and 
energy use, and travel cost. There could be negative impacts associated with progressive taxation 
and basic income, as a reduction in income would lead to a smaller travel budget. Those traveling 






less day a week. As for time used for housework, a gendered variable where women still do the 
majority of housework (e.g. Rochette, 2016), I was expecting mixed effects as well. Specifically, 
I was expecting a positive effect on support for basic income, because people would be able to 
invest more of their time to unpaid activities, be it unpaid work or leisure (Anxo et al., 2011). It is 
possible that the sample size was too small to capture the effect of these variables, or that they 
simply do not have an effect at all.  
Support for each policy is likely to be higher among those with higher environmental values. 
These findings were expected, as environmental values have been found to have a positive effect 
on choosing the environment over the economy (e.g. Xu & Li, 2018). This indicates that 
individuals with higher environmental values are more willing to make sacrifices for the 
environment and are more concerned with justice and equality. 
The relative increases in policy support brought by reading social rationality statements is 
important to explore. By informing respondents of the implications of certain anthropogenic 
activities on other beings and on the environment, some were successfully able to consider these 
implications, rather than solely reflect on how they would be affected as individuals. After reading 
the social rationality statements for the policy proposals of limiting trade, banning new 
infrastructure, taxing resource use, and creating a basic income, there was a 15pp, 12pp, 13pp, and 
7pp increase in policy support, respectively. Instead of being concerned with, say, their finances 
or the economy, it is probable that these respondents recognized that there are bigger issues at hand 
such as environmental degradation, poverty and inequality. Recall Etzioni’s (1988) description of 
the role of individuals in neoclassical economics, where individuals are assumed to be decision 
makers independent of societal factors, versus his proposed I&We paradigm, where individuals 






group which they are a part of. Individuals can rationalize as themselves or as part of a community. 
The aim of the social rationality statements included in this study was to examine whether or not 
the reflection as part of a community/group would have participants initially against a policy 
change their minds. While this is only a small section of this thesis, it brings forth valuable 
information. It is possible to change people’s opinions by providing information and having them 
consider how their decisions may affect others. 
In addition to exploring public opinions on degrowth policy proposals, a few questions 
were included to garner information on opinions about a degrowth transition in Canada. Notably, 
only 28% of respondents reportedly had heard of and understand what degrowth entails. This 
speaks to the lack of traction degrowth has had outside of academia and activism (see Weiss & 
Cattaneo, 2017). Of this portion, 59% said they would be in favor of a degrowth transition, 
indicating that many people see the value in sustainable societies, which could be achieved by 
monumental lifestyle changes and downscaling of the economy. Of the portion who did not support 
the idea of a degrowth transition, the main reported concerns were about negative impacts to the 
economy, lowered quality of life, that it was utopic, while many respondents provided no 
reasoning. Those who had never heard of degrowth (72%) were supplied a commonly used 
definition and asked whether they would support a transition. Of this portion, 66% said they would 
be in favor. Those who were against the idea were similarly concerned with negative impacts to 
the economy, lowered quality of life, and believing it would be impossible to implement, as well 
as government control. Many respondents were simply against the idea and supplied no reasoning. 
It would therefore be of great value to put forth concrete strategies for a degrowth transition that 






Interestingly, individuals who spend more time traveling are more likely to support a 
degrowth transition, among those who have already heard of degrowth. One can expect that an 
increase in amount of time travelling indicates an increase in time working, be it paid or unpaid 
(e.g. housework, household errands). This finding could illustrate that people would appreciate the 
decrease in necessary travel brought by degrowth, through a reduction of work hours, incentives 
for local production and consumption, or the promotion of decreases in consumption patterns. As 
for those who were supplied with a definition of degrowth, the likelihood of support for a degrowth 
transition decreased with age. This ties in with the argument that older people are more integrated 
in the dominant social order (Van Liere & Dunlap, 1980), leading them to be unsupportive of a 
paradigm that would potentially threaten it. As expected, individuals with higher environmental 
values are more likely to support a degrowth transition, whether they have heard of it or not. 
Considering that degrowth stands for environmental sustainability (among other things), it is 
natural that those who care for the environment want to make changes in order to protect it.  
Concerns with economic impacts and lowered quality of life through degrowth clearly 
speak to the perceived ties between economic growth and wellbeing (see Büchs & Koch, 2019). 
Many people have been made to believe that economic growth is indisputably positive and are 
therefore against anything that poses a threat to it and their lifestyles. The political and economic 
challenges a degrowth transition would face are immense and they have received a lot of attention 
in the literature. Really, the transition does seem utopic as long as it is only being fought for by a 
minority of people. Degrowth will only be possible as a completely democratic process (e.g. Buch-
Hansen, 2018, Cattaneo et al., 2012). 
Several limitations can be identified in this study. The small sample size was due to both 






Montréal population due to Dynata’s nonprobability opt-in panel that inherently excludes people 
who are not using the internet, making the sample non-random. Further, the limited number of 
survey questions aimed at capturing environmental values was also restricted by budget 
limitations, therefore potentially not adequately reflecting the full scope of respondents’ 
environmental values. A rather important limitation to this study design is the online survey’s 
limited ability to capture the collective rationality of the respondents. A more appropriate 
methodology for this portion of the study would have been conducting a focus group, whereby 
deliberation and collective processes could have facilitated a social rationality. A focus group, 
being a group interview in which interviews can speak to and interact with one another, allows 
participants to probe one another’s reasons for holding a particular view, which can sometimes 
lead to them qualifying or modifying their response (Bryman & Bell, 2016). A focus group setting 
would have allowed respondents to discuss each of their positions within the social system and 
allow others to understand possible implications of a policy that they had not thought of 
themselves. As individuals with different cultural and socioeconomic backgrounds would be 
affected differently by each policy, a focus group would be ideal for facilitating a shift from an 
individual rationality to a social one. Further, the definitions used to explain policy proposals could 
certainly act as limitations, as responses would most likely vary if they were explained differently. 
For example, the use of the word “moratorium” may have confused people who did not fully 
understand what it meant, as several respondents misunderstood the question/definition. Instead, I 
could have introduced the policy as a “ban on new infrastructure”. Likewise, the inclusion of the 
possibility of being taxed 100% in a progressive taxation scheme seemed to deter several 
respondents from supporting the policy. The 100% taxation scenario could have been more clearly 






were also confused by this definition. Similarly, different wording used for the social rationality 
statements may have led to more respondents changing their opinions on a policy. The definition 
used for degrowth also caused some confusion among participants. Overall, definitions could have 
been made simpler and clearer.  
Future research on this topic should try to overcome these limitations to the extent possible, 
as wording and framing has been found to be important in public opinion surveys on policy support 
(Reimers, 2009). This area of research would benefit from further studies with larger samples 
covering a larger geographic area, assessments of public opinions on additional degrowth policy 
proposals, and an in-depth investigation on whether the public, as a whole, is interested in 
degrowth. Researchers specifically interested in the effects of social rationality on public opinion 
should conduct qualitative research using methods like focus groups, to allow for deliberation 
between participants, as well as interviews to gather more in-depth information on public opinions. 
Further exploration of public concerns about degrowth policies and reasoning for not supporting 
them would bring forth valuable information for policymakers.  
In conclusion, this study found that there exists public support for degrowth and degrowth 
policies in Montréal, demonstrating that many people care about social justice and the 
environment. Concerns about fairness, trust and negative impacts on the economy need to be 
addressed in order to garner further support. In Québec specifically it should be noted that any 
form of taxation policies would likely not receive much support due to current provincial tax rates. 
While some believe degrowth to be unrealistic, establishing concrete strategies for its 
implementation that address public concerns could prove degrowth to be a promising avenue for 













As we approach (and will likely exceed) global temperature targets that were set in the 
2015 Paris Agreement due to inadequate efforts to mitigate climate change (United Nations, 2018), 
countless people continue to live in unfavorable conditions that are likely to worsen as the 
environment deteriorates (IPCC, 2018). Scientists have warned for many years that anthropogenic 
activity is harming the environment and that economic growth is not sustainable (e.g. Carson, 
1962; Daly, 1991, 1996; Georgescu-Roegen, 1971, 1975; Hirsch, 1976; Meadows et al., 1972). 
Degrowth, a suggested alternative paradigm to capitalism, has been brought forth as a potential 
pathway to environmental and social sustainability. By reducing the environmental impact of 
human activities, redistributing income and wealth both within and between countries, and 
promoting a transition from a materialistic to a convivial and participatory society (Cosme et al., 
2017), degrowth could be an ideal solution to the world’s current state of emergency. The political 
and economic feasibility of a degrowth transition has been well addressed and challenged in 
academic literature (e.g. Büchs & Koch, 2019; Tokic, 2012; van den Bergh, 2011), however this 
study is interested in social and cultural feasibility. Democratic agreement is fundamental for 
degrowth to take place (Kallis, 2018), therefore public opinion studies on the topic are crucial for 
understanding both the more favorable aspects and the social barriers of the movement. 
Specifically, in representative democracies, public opinion is a driver of policymaking in that the 






feasibility of policy implementation is dependent on societal attitudes and the willingness to accept 
change (Drews et al., 2018). 
In this study, I explored policy support for 6 degrowth proposals: limiting trade distances 
and volume, creating a moratorium on new infrastructure, taxing resource use, progressive 
taxation, creating a basic income, and reducing work hours. I looked at socio-demographic 
determinants of policy support, the effects of social rationality, support for a degrowth transition 
in Canada, and socio-demographic determinants of support for the transition. I found that the 
majority of respondents supported 4 out of 6 policy proposals, with a minority support for taxing 
resource use and progressive taxation. This finding demonstrates that many people care about 
social justice and the state of the environment, and would likely support policies that address such 
issues.  
The main reasons provided for not supporting the policies included personal financial 
concerns, the fear that they would negatively impact the economy, concerns with fairness, distrust 
in the government, that they are unrealistic to implement, or that they are simply not necessary. As 
the majority of electricity in Québec is generated through hydropower, many respondents seemed 
content with its sustainability. Importantly, Québec is highly taxed compared to the other Canadian 
provinces, therefore respondents felt more strongly against the ideas of increased taxation, both 
for income and resource use. Taxation policies will likely not garner much support in Montréal 
and should therefore be avoided until necessary. Moreover, the framing of policy proposals has 
proven to be very important. Proposals should ensure that issues of fairness and trust be addressed, 
specifically income related policies, because those with higher incomes are less likely to support 






also include detailed explanations of potential effects to the economy, as well as plans to manage 
the effects.  
With the goal of having respondents consider the implications of their actions (or policy 
support), the inclusion of social rationality statements for those who disapproved of a policy 
proposal successfully engaged some participants and lead to them altering their decision. 
Considering that surveys are not a recommended method for studying collective ways of thinking 
(Etzioni, 1988), alternative methods like focus groups would likely lead to greater facilitation of 
social rationality and thus a more collective understanding of issues such as social and 
environmental sustainability. Therefore, it would likely be effective to bring groups of people 
together from different communities in Montréal in order to discuss current social-environmental 
issues like climate change, poverty and unequal access to resources, and identify the ways in which 
addressing them would be most acceptable. 
As older individuals are less likely to support degrowth policies, it would be worthwhile to 
conduct further research on their specific concerns and reasoning. If it is a case of being more 
integrated and invested in the dominant social order (Van Liere & Dunlap, 1980), perhaps 
education is the best course of action here because environmental values have been found to 
decline with age (e.g. Franzen & Meyer, 2010; Hawcroft & Milfont, 2010), but increase with 
educational attainment (e.g. Dunlap et al., 2000; Ejelöv & Nilsson, 2020; Franzen & Meyer, 2010; 
Franzen & Vogl 2013; Tomaselli et al., 2019, Xu & Li, 2018). Relatedly, since environmental 
values consistently indicated higher likelihood of policy support in this study, it is clear that 
increased education and effective communication of current issues are necessary to achieve 






Further, I found that the majority of respondents would support a degrowth transition in 
Canada, while those who are against the idea gave no reason, expressed concerns about negative 
impacts on the economy, or believed it to be unrealistic. Again, plans for implementation need to 
be clearly laid out, including concrete strategies to address public concerns.  
The methodological choices for this study came with limitations. The nonprobability opt-
in panel used for participant recruitment means that the findings presented in this study are not 
fully representative of the Montréal population. The small sample size and limited number of 
survey questions (resulting in a limited number of variables) was due to budget limitations. The 
use of a survey questionnaire meant a limited ability to study the effects of social rationality as 
respondents reflected on their answers on their own as individuals – a more appropriate method 
for this topic is the use of focus groups, where individuals can deliberate ideas together. Further, 
framing and word choice affected respondents’ opinions, by confusing them, being unclear or even 
deterring them from supporting degrowth. Definitions and explanations should be made clear and 
simple in future research. Next, this study had a focus on those who are against degrowth; it would 
be worthwhile to conduct research examining the ideological profiles of people with these opinions 
(e.g. anti-socialists, capitalists) to understand the moral underpinnings and implications of these 
views. Also, another interesting point of view to engage with would be why people do support 
degrowth, as it could prove helpful to understand how and why people think differently about the 
social and environmental issues addressed by degrowth.  
Degrowth largely remains a theoretical paradigm, sought after by a faction of individuals 
around the world with hope for a sustainable and equitable society which virtually eliminates its 






drastically cut GHG emissions, reduce environmental degradation or address social inequality, 
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Module 1 – Demographics 
 
 
Question Response Options 
1 What is your age? - 18 to 24 
- 25 to 34 
- 35 to 44 
- 45 to 54 
- Over 55 
2 Which of the following best describes your combined annual 
household income after taxes (includes employment income, 
government transfers, Registered Retirement Savings Plan (RRSP), 
etc.)? 
- Under $29,999 
- $30,000 to $59,999 
- $60,000 to $89,999 
- $90,000 to $119,999 
- $120,000 to 149,999 
- Over $150,000 
3 What is the highest level of education you have completed? - High school diploma 
-  Some CEGEP or 
university 
- CEGEP or technical 
school certificate 
-  Undergraduate degree 
-  Graduate degree 
4 What is your current employment status? - Employed full time (40+ 
hours a week)  
- Employed part time (less 
than 40 hours a week) 
- Unemployed 







- Retired  
- Unable to work  
5 On average, how many hours per week do you spend:  
a. Travelling / commuting  
b. Housework (preparing meals, washing dishes, cleaning house, 
washing laundry) 
a. ____ hours / week 
b. ____ hours / week 
 
6 In politics people sometimes talk of “left” and “right”. Where would 
you place yourself on this scale?  
5-point scale from ‘left-
wing’ to ‘right-wing’ 
 
Module 2 – Environmental values and faith in technology  
*Note: Statements 2-5 taken from La Trobe & Acott (2000) + Question 7 taken from Curry, Ansolabehere 
& Herzog (2007) 
 
 
Statement   Response Options  
1 How concerned are you about climate change?  5-point scale from ‘not at all 
concerned’ to ‘extremely concerned’ 
2 A change in basic attitudes and values is necessary in 
order to solve environmental problems.  
5-point scale from ‘strongly disagree’ 
to ‘strongly agree’ 
3 Technology can overcome any environmental problems.  5-point scale from ‘strongly disagree’ 
to ‘strongly agree’ 
4 Natural resources should be used primarily to provide for 
basic needs rather than material wealth.  
5-point scale from ‘strongly disagree’ 
to ‘strongly agree’ 
5 Humans are presently interfering too much with the 
natural environment.  
5-point scale from ‘strongly disagree’ 
to ‘strongly agree’ 
6 The highest priority should be given to protecting the 
environment, even if it hurts the economy. 
 
5-point scale from ‘strongly disagree’ 
to ‘strongly agree’ 
 
Module 3 – Policy support  










1 Would you support a policy that limited trade distances and volume?  
For example, this could mean paying more for imported tropical fruits, or not having 
access to them at all.  
 
→ If no, go to 1b 
yes/no 
1b In September 2019, Canada imported $50 billion and exported $50 billion worth of 
goods and services. 
 
Some of the major results of the international trade we support through our 
consumption habits include: greenhouse gas emissions from increased economic 
activity and transportation, pollution, degrading natural resources, etc. 
 
Considering this, would you support a policy that limited trade distances and 
volume?  
 





2 Would you support the creation of a moratorium (a ban) on new infrastructure, such 
as oil sand projects and affiliated pipelines (other examples could include nuclear 
power plants, highways and dams)?  
 
→ If no, go to 2b 
yes/no  
 
2b Some of the major results of oil sands projects and pipelines include: violation of 
Indigenous rights, greenhouse gas emissions, waste management issues, pipeline 
leaks and ruptures, decreased air quality, risks to wildlife, population displacement, 
water contamination, etc. 
 
Considering this, would you support the creation of a moratorium on new 
infrastructure, such as oil sands projects and pipelines?  
 




3 Would you support the implementation of taxes on resource use, such as home 
energy consumption (other examples could include water consumption and petrol)? 
For instance, you would pay more for using electricity for lighting, heating, cooling, 
and refrigeration and for operating appliances, computers, and electronics.  
 
→ If no, go to 3b 
yes/no 
 
3b Some of the major results of our energy consumption include: climate change due to 







unequal access to energy, health impacts from air pollution, population 
displacement, dam failures, etc.  
 
Considering this, would you support the implementation of taxes on resource use, 
for example, on home energy consumption? 
 
→ If no, why not? 
+ open 
ended 
4 Would you support the implementation of progressive taxation?  
 
Progressive taxation: a progressive income tax could end in a 100 per cent tax on 
incomes over a certain democratically determined level, thereby effectively creating 
a maximum wage. The surplus could be used to pay for a basic income or tax breaks 
for the poor. Progressive taxation would therefore restrict the consumption of some, 
while allowing others to consume their fair share of resources. 
 





5 Would you support the implementation of a universal basic income?  
 
Universal basic income: every person living permanently in a nation would receive 
from the state an unconditional periodic payment, and this payment would be 
sufficient for an individual to live at a minimal though dignified standard of 
economic security.  
 
→ If no, go to 5b 
yes/no 
5b While a universal basic income would lead some people to earn less money, it would 
also alleviate those in poverty by ensuring that everyone’s basic human needs (i.e. 
supply of clean water, food, housing) are met.  
 
Considering this, would you support the implementation of a universal basic 
income? 
 




6 Would you support a reduction of working hours policy (for example, having a four-
day work week)? Your general income would therefore also be reduced, but you 
would keep the same benefits, pension, and hourly wage, and this policy would 
allow for more leisure time.  
 










Module 4 – Degrowth awareness and support  





1 Have you heard of degrowth and understand what it entails?   
 
→ If yes, go to question2; if no, go to question 3 
yes/no 
2 Would you support a transition to degrowth in Canada?  
 
→ If no, why not? 
yes/no 
+ open ended 
3 See Box 1 for a full definition of degrowth.  
The policy proposals you assessed from Section 3 are each associated with 
degrowth.  
 
Based on this definition, would you support a transition to degrowth in 
Canada?  
 
→ If no, why not? 
yes/no 







Box 1. Definition of degrowth  
 “Sustainable degrowth is a downscaling of production and consumption that increases human 
well-being and enhances ecological conditions and equity on the planet. It calls for a future where 
societies live within their ecological means, with open, localized economies and resources more equally 
distributed through new forms of democratic institutions. Such societies will no longer have to “grow or 
die.” Material accumulation will no longer hold a prime position in the population’s cultural imaginary. 
The [priority] of efficiency will be substituted by a focus on sufficiency, and innovation will no longer 
focus on technology for technology’s sake but will concentrate on new social and technical arrangements 






challenge the centrality of GDP as an overarching policy objective but proposes a framework for 
transformation to a lower and sustainable level of production and consumption, a shrinking of the 
economic system to leave more space for human cooperation and ecosystems” (Research & Degrowth, 
2019).    
 
 
 
 
